



Danish Institute for International Studies

The anatomy of displacement

Gaza, West Bank and South Lebanon

Chemlali, Ahlam; Andersen, Lars Erslev

Publication date:
2025

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for pulished version (APA):

Chemlali, A., & Andersen, L. E. (2025). *The anatomy of displacement: Gaza, West Bank and South Lebanon*. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). DIIS Report Vol. 2015 No. 14

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Authors

This report is written by Ahlam Chemlali, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Politics and Society, Aalborg University, and Lars Erslev Andersen, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

Publisher

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies
Stockholmsgade 45
DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark
Tel: +45 32 69 87 87
E-mail: diis@diis.dk
www.diis.dk

Design and Layout

Layout, tables and figures by Ravnkilde Design
Cover illustration by Rasmus Fly Filbert (photo in front: Jaber Jihad Badwan, Wikimedia Commons)

Printing

Printed in Denmark by Johansen Grafisk A/S
All DIIS Reports are printed on Ecolabel and FSC certified paper

ISBN

978-87-7236-214-4 print
978-87-7236-215-1 pdf

Access

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk

Copyright

© Copenhagen 2025, the authors and DIIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	5
Introduction	7
A history of displacement	23
Beyond Gaza: displacement in the West Bank and Lebanon	33
Conclusion	43
Policy relevance and recommendations	45
Notes	48
Bibliography	56

The authors wish to thank Dr Jasmin Lilian Diab, Director of the Institute for Migration Studies at the Lebanese American University (LAU), for providing data for the case study on South Lebanon, and the anonymous reviewer for their constructive and generous feedback on an earlier draft of this report. Senior Researcher and Head of Department for Migration and Global Order at DIIS, Dr Ida Marie Vammen, also contributed with constructive comments to the draft, for which we are grateful.

Editing of this report was finalised in mid-October 2025, prior to the negotiations surrounding the so-called Trump Plan for Peace in Gaza. While the plan's initial phase began under a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, it remains uncertain whether it will bring about a genuine and lasting peace or end the extensive displacement strategy that has defined life in Gaza over the past two years. Statements by Jared Kushner, who played a central role in drafting the plan, and by Trump's Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, suggesting the commencement of reconstruction in the 53% of Gaza still under Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) control, unfortunately offer little hope that displacement and continued killing has concluded for Gaza's residents. Moreover, the plan has done nothing to improve conditions in the West Bank and South Lebanon; in several respects, it has exacerbated them. A detailed analysis of the Trump plan and subsequent developments in Gaza falls beyond the scope of this report.

ABSTRACT

This report examines the structural nature of displacement across Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. It argues that displacement is not a humanitarian side effect of conflict but a deliberate and recurring strategy of Israeli governance, rooted in decades of settler-colonial and military control. From the mass expulsions of 1948 to the blockade of Gaza and the ongoing destruction since October 2023, displacement has functioned as a mechanism to fragment Palestinian society, reshape demography and consolidate territorial control.

In Gaza, forced evacuations, starvation-induced displacement and the dismantling of UNRWA's aid network have transformed basic survival needs into tools of coercion. Legal scholars and human rights organisations identify these actions as violations of international humanitarian law, consistent with the crimes of forcible transfer, ethnic cleansing and genocide. In the West Bank, parallel dynamics of settler violence and expansion, demolition of homes and camps, administrative fragmentation, creeping annexation and militarised displacement extend the same logic, making secure residence and return increasingly impossible. In Lebanon, cycles of flight and return intersect with Israeli evacuation orders and European externalisation policies that risk transforming containment into a form of governance, trapping displaced populations in protracted precarity.

The report concludes that displacement across these contexts is a structural and politically engineered condition, sustained not only by Israeli policies but also by the complicity and inaction of international actors. Addressing it therefore requires coordinated legal, institutional and political responses grounded in accountability, protection and the right of return.



Trimming olive trees in Palestine, between 1934-1939. Photo: Matson Collection / Library of Congress.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trimming_olive_trees_in_Palestine_LOC_matpc.16614.jpg
Wikimedia Commons.


INTRODUCTION

This report examines how displacement has functioned as a central and continuous mechanism of governance in Gaza and the broader Palestinian territories, rather than as an incidental consequence of conflict. It asks how and why displacement has become a structural and recurring feature of Palestinian history, culminating in the near-total uprooting of Gaza's population today. Through this lens, the report situates the present human tragedy within a century-long trajectory of forced movement, demographic engineering and spatial control that links Gaza's ongoing destruction to the broader history of settler colonialism in Palestine. It argues that displacement is not merely a humanitarian symptom but a core political logic shaping Israeli governance and international responses alike.

The report's analytical intervention lies in reframing displacement from a humanitarian emergency to a structural condition that is legally prohibited, politically produced and internationally sustained. It contributes to three interrelated debates. The first is legal, concerning the applicability of international humanitarian and criminal law, including the Genocide Convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute. The second is humanitarian, addressing the limits of aid and relief systems under conditions of blockade and occupation. The third is political, examining how dominant paradigms such as the two-state solution have normalised rather than resolved forced displacement.

The immediate background to this inquiry is the ongoing war in Gaza, which has prompted intense legal and political debate over whether Israel's actions constitute genocide. Following South Africa's case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 29 December 2023, the Court ruled on 26 January 2024 that there was a

plausible risk of genocide and ordered Israel to take measures to ensure humanitarian assistance and to prevent genocide.¹ In the months that followed, Amnesty International,² B'Tselem,³ the International Association of Genocide Scholars⁴ and a United Nations Commission of Inquiry all concluded that Israel's warfare in Gaza constitutes genocide and 'direct evidence of genocidal intent'.⁵ These findings have been rejected by Israel and the United States, while several Western governments have stated that they will await the ICJ's final judgment. Nevertheless, the ICJ's acceptance of the case and the broad recognition among international experts and scholars that the legal criteria for genocide appear to be met indicate a major shift in the global understanding of the conflict.⁶



The report's analytical intervention lies in reframing displacement from a humanitarian emergency to a structural condition that is legally prohibited, politically produced and internationally sustained.

While this report refrains from making a definitive legal determination pending the ICJ's ruling, it takes seriously the mounting consensus that the unprecedented destruction, displacement and starvation in Gaza reflect systematic policies aimed at eliminating Palestinian life and presence. Against this backdrop, the report focuses on the humanitarian, historical and political dimensions of displacement in Gaza, the West Bank and among refugees in South Lebanon, situating these developments within the longer continuum of Palestinian dispossession since 1948. It traces how successive legal regimes, military operations and international interventions have transformed displacement from an episodic crisis into a permanent governance tool.

The analysis draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including historical and legal texts, United Nations and non-governmental reports, media documentation and interviews with experts and humanitarian practitioners. The inclusion of interview material reflects the report's broader aim of capturing the lived realities of displacement where official data are incomplete or delayed. While the analyses of Gaza and the West Bank rely primarily on secondary sources, the Lebanon section incorporates first-hand testimony to illustrate how local actors and communities experience and manage displacement in real time. Given the sensitivity of the topic and the evolving nature of the conflict, all factual claims are supported by verifiable sources.

The report is organised into four main chapters that build cumulatively. The introduction establishes the conceptual and analytical framework through discussions of genocide, ethnic cleansing, settler colonialism, and situates these within relevant legal and historical contexts. The second chapter traces how forced movement, dispossession and containment have evolved from the 1948 Nakba to the present, including the dynamics of displacement following 7 October 2023 and the mechanisms of evacuation orders, humanitarian containment and economic inducement that sustain it. The third chapter broadens the focus to show how similar patterns of coerced mobility and demographic engineering unfold across the region, examining both the 'Gazafication' of the West Bank and Lebanon's experience as a host country and containment partner. The final chapter synthesises the report's main findings and presents concrete policy recommendations focused on recognition, accountability and rights-based solutions.

Genocide, ethnic cleansing and settler colonialism

United Nations reports conclude that Israel's warfare in both Gaza and the West Bank is taking place in violation of international law and that Israel is violating the Geneva Conventions on how an occupying power should act in occupied territories. In an advisory opinion on 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that Israel's occupation and colonisation of the West Bank are illegal, that the occupation must end, and that the Israeli presence in the occupied Palestinian territories must cease as soon as possible.⁷

In its more than 80-page statement, the ICJ notes in paragraph 94 that, despite Israel's withdrawal in 2005, Gaza is still occupied territory in the sense of international law because Israel controls access to and from the territory from land, airspace and water, and thus has the control of an occupying power over Gaza. The ICJ argues that Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem constitute a 'Palestinian entity' under Israeli occupation that is illegal under international law. So is Israel's administration of the territory, not least the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which, according to the ICJ in its advisory opinion, Israel must leave as soon as possible. The ICJ also concluded that Israel is obliged to compensate for the damage caused in the Palestinian territories during the more than 70 years of occupation.

Israel rejected the ICJ's assessment and the conclusions to be drawn from it, while the White House did not provide an official response to the ICJ's advisory opinion. The US State Department stated that the Israeli settlements are 'inconsistent with international law' but that the ICJ's advisory opinion 'will complicate efforts to resolve the conflict'.⁸ It has been the policy of the United States since 1967 (which

Denmark has followed) that Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories in violation of international law can only be ended through negotiations between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states. Since no negotiations are taking place, Israel's colonisation of the West Bank continues, which results both in the expulsion of Palestinians from their territory and in Israeli annexation of their land.

In its advisory opinion, the ICJ explicitly states that both the annexation of the occupied territories and the change of the demographic composition of the occupied territories are contrary to international law, meaning that both the relocation of Jewish citizens and the expulsion of Palestinians are contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The expansion of settlements, land annexation and displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have intensified under the current Israeli government both before and especially after 7 October 2023.

Changing the population composition of a territory through the relocation by force of one group and the displacement of another is termed ethnic cleansing. The concept was popularised during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and has since been used by the United Nations and scholars to describe systematic efforts to remove a population from a defined territory.⁹ However, ethnic cleansing is not a formal legal category under international law, whereas genocide has a precise definition in the Genocide Convention. Gregory Stanton, founder of Genocide Watch, has argued against the widespread use of the term ethnic cleansing because, lacking a legal definition, its proliferation in the media risks diverting attention from situations that should properly be classified and prosecuted as genocide.¹⁰ The distinction between these two concepts is therefore significant and will be discussed further below.

Changing demographics in Palestine has been an integral part of the Zionist Organization's establishment of a 'Jewish homeland' in Palestine since the 1930s, perhaps even earlier, and of Israel's policy since its establishment on 14 May 1948.¹¹ Theodor Herzl had already written in his diaries about getting Palestinians to leave the country and follows this in his utopian novel *AltNeuLand* (1902).¹²

In 1930, Chaim Weizmann and in 1937 David Ben-Gurion had contacts with British diplomats and embassies, especially the Russian one, about the need for Jews to become a majority and the need for Palestinians and local 'non-Jews' to be transferred to countries outside Palestine. It was called 'transfer' and was inspired

by the agreement between Greece and Turkey on the transfer of up to two million people in continuation of the peace agreement after the First World War.¹³ Among other things, they approached Druze about moving to Syria for a fee.

Terms used for 'voluntary migration' were transfer and relocation, while in the use of 'coercive migration' there has been talk of forced migration, displacement and ethnic cleansing. Both under the Zionists up to 1948 and by Israel since its establishment, all these methods and terminologies have been used. This is well documented by both Israeli historians and international research.¹⁴

Reports from the United Nations, including OCHA and the UN Commission of Inquiry, as well as findings by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented patterns of mass forced displacement and population transfer amounting to ethnic cleansing in the occupied Palestinian territories. These include the destruction of homes, mass evacuations and the prevention of return, all of which contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention.¹⁵

Scholarly studies also describe the systematic nature of these practices. Ilan Pappé (2006), Nur Masalha (1992) and Simha Flapan (1987) provide extensive historical evidence showing that during the 1948 war, Zionist militias such as the Haganah, Irgun and Stern Group carried out coordinated campaigns of depopulation that led to the displacement of approximately 750,000 Palestinians. These actions, according to legal scholars and human rights experts, fit the descriptive criteria of ethnic cleansing, though not formally codified as a crime under international law.

In the current context, the UN and several humanitarian agencies have similarly raised concern that Israeli military operations and restrictions on civilian movement in Gaza and the West Bank produce conditions consistent with ethnic cleansing. OCHA's ongoing monitoring of demolitions and displacement notes that forced evictions, denial of humanitarian access and widespread destruction have accelerated under the present Israeli government.¹⁶ Public statements by Israeli officials regarding the relocation of Gaza's residents to other countries have further heightened these concerns, prompting renewed debate among international lawyers about the legality of such actions.

Since the recognition of Israel, the United States has accepted the idea that the displaced Palestinians in 1948 should be relocated to Arab countries, where Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan are proposed.¹⁷ Donald Trump's proposal for a peace plan, published in 2020, also refers to the stateless Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan being integrated into the Arab states for a fee.¹⁸

This is partly because the plan suggests that, in the years following the 1948 war, Israel received about as many Jews fleeing the Middle East as there were displaced Palestinians, estimating upwards of 800,000. The figure, however, is too high when it comes to the period 1949–52. According to the Jewish Virtual Library, which bases its figures on Israel's State Archives, 377,000 Jews arrived in Israel from Muslim countries during this period.

During the period of the Ottoman Empire, the Jews had lived safely, but with Jewish immigration to Palestine and the risk that they would take over the country, Arab and Palestinian nationalism grew, and so did anti-Semitism, not least encouraged by the bulletins issued by the Palestinian leader Amin al-Husseini with Nazi inspiration from his office. The establishment of Israel led to demonstrations in Arab cities such as Constantine, Cairo and Baghdad, which developed violently with attacks on Jews and synagogues, creating insecurity in Jewish communities. This caused many to move to Israel, Europe, as well as the United States and Australia.

Israel, which after its independence had a strong need for immigration to build the state, encouraged many to move to the country, and there is evidence that Israeli agents operated in the Arab countries to persuade the so-called Oriental Jews to immigrate to Israel. There are even examples in the literature of how Israeli agents organised riots and violence to scare Jews into immigrating. Johannes Due Enstad has critically reviewed the research literature and concludes that there was no coordinated Arab programme to expel Jews, but that both pull effects (Israeli agitation for immigration) and push effects (greater insecurity as a result of increasing Arab anti-Semitism after the establishment of Israel) played limited roles compared to the Jews who lived in poverty in the Middle East and thus were attracted to a new life in the Israeli state.¹⁹

There is thus a fundamental difference between the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians in 1948 and the immigration of 377,000 Oriental Jews, both in number and in causes, in addition to which the Oriental Jews were granted citizenship,

which the expelled Palestinians and their descendants still do not have, because the Arab states recognise their affiliation with Palestine and see it as a failure of the Palestinian cause to integrate them.

This raises the question of what the difference between genocide and ethnic cleansing is. Genocide is defined in the Genocide Convention as the intention to eradicate one of the four groups mentioned in the Convention, which are national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. Ethnic cleansing intends to use violence to change the demographic composition of a defined territory by reducing the number of a particular group and increasing the number of another.

The violence used is the same as the acts described in the Genocide Convention, but the intention is to remove a people from a particular territory, not to exterminate the entire population. The difference, then, is whether the intention is the extermination of an entire people, the Palestinians as a people, or whether the intention is the removal of a particular group from a specific area, such as the removal of Palestinians from Palestine. The demographic composition can also be altered by persuasion other than violence and coercion.

For example, as mentioned, in the late 1930s the Zionist Organization tried to persuade Druze and Arabs in Palestine to migrate out of Palestine by offering them money.²⁰ It was referred to as 'transfer', and today, 2025, the United States and Israel are talking about 'voluntary migration' from Gaza to get Palestinians in Gaza to move, also by offering the money. Statements by members of the government, including Benjamin Netanyahu, that the destruction of homes and livelihoods in Gaza is intended to force Palestinians to ask for transfer to another country fall under ethnic cleansing and not transfer or 'voluntary migration'.²¹

One of the pioneers in research into genocide and ethnic cleansing, the historian Patrick Wolfe, contributed to the development of the concept of settler colonialism.²² Unlike other forms of colonialism, settler colonialism is defined by the fact that the purpose of colonisation is to take over and acquire the territory, not merely to extract resources or control strategic hubs.

This can be carried out by the establishment of bases or smaller colonies, but without the intention of acquiring the territory of the country in question. Settler colonialism, by contrast, aims to take over the entire territory by purposefully changing the demographic composition, as occurred when white Europeans

colonised the American continent and expelled the native population.²³ Other examples include European colonisation in Australia, South Africa and Canada. Patrick Wolfe defines settler colonialism as a structure: 'Invasion is a structure, not an event'.

Settler colonialism does not occur once and for all but continuously and systematically removes the indigenous population's belonging to the territory by annexing it, renaming it, and, in Wolfe's definition, eliminating the indigenous people's belonging to the territory by demolishing and destroying their buildings and historical heritage to build an entirely new civilisation. Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank and the removal of all signs of Palestinian and other civilisation in Gaza City, for example razing Gaza City to the ground in order to build new structures that do not refer to Gaza's history, illustrate Wolfe's definition of the elimination of an indigenous population's belonging to its territory and thus the definition of settler colonialism as a structure.

Israeli Finance Minister Bezael Smotrich described Gaza City in an interview as a 'real estate bonanza' and continued: 'The demolition, the first stage in [Gaza City's] renewal, we have already done. Now we need to build'.²⁴

The concept of settler colonialism, which has gained increasing ground in academic debates on the Palestinian question in Israeli as well as in international research and historiography, has been criticised for being an ideology precisely because of the definition of settler colonisation as a structure and not as a historically past event. In his 2024 book, Adam Kirsch argues that Israel's and the United States' colonisation is a past historical chapter that does not characterise the current Israel.²⁵

However, it is difficult not to understand the statements of key Israeli ministers and politicians today, as well as the constant expansion of settlement policy in the West Bank and the way the war is currently being waged in Gaza, as anything other than settler colonialism with the intention of structurally eliminating the Palestinians' belonging to the territory of historic Palestine.²⁶ Therefore, the theories of settler colonialism are used as a theoretical starting point for the analysis in this report.

In relation to the discussion of the difference and relationship between ethnic cleansing and genocide, it is worth noting that Wolfe begins his classic article *Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native* (2006) by stating that 'Settler

colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal'. Settler colonialism operates through ethnic cleansing of the territory but not necessarily with an intention to annihilate the group, as the Palestinians can live on elsewhere.

For Wolfe, this means that Raphael Lemkin's classic definition of genocide must be supplemented with an expanded definition based on the historical experience of the United States and Israel in particular.²⁷ However, this is a discussion that should not be pursued in this report. It defines the Zionist Organization, or Israel's project to build a state in Palestine, as a settler-colonial project that uses the elimination of the Palestinians' belonging to Palestine as a method and strategy for achieving Jewish and Israeli control of the entire territory of historic Palestine. This definition has been used and documented by both Israeli and international research.²⁸

This section has shown that Israel's policies toward Gaza and the West Bank operate within a broader framework of settler colonialism, where territorial control is achieved through the systematic displacement and erasure of the indigenous Palestinian population. These practices are not isolated acts of conflict but reflect a sustained project of demographic engineering rooted in the ideological foundations of Zionism, a relationship explored further in the next section.

Zionism and the state

Israel was established by a unilateral declaration on 14 May 1948, after the United Nations had established that the plan of partition for Palestine adopted by the General Assembly in November 1947 could not be realised.²⁹ Shortly after Israel's declaration of independence, the United States, through President Harry S. Truman, recognised the state of Israel, quickly followed by the recognition from many other UN states, thereby recognising Israel in the international community as a sovereign state. In the Israeli Declaration of Independence, borders are not defined because the expectation of the Jewish community in Palestine was that the ensuing war would lead to further conquest of territory, which in fact happened and West Jerusalem became part of the new Israeli state.

After the 1948 war, Israel came to control 77% of the historical territory of Palestine. Gaza was controlled by Egypt and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was annexed by Transjordanian in 1950, which changed its name to Jordan.³⁰ In 1925, an important group in the Zionist movement established the Revisionist Zionists party led by Vladimir Jabotinsky, who believed that the territory of the Jewish state should include the present-day Jordan in addition to historical Palestine.³¹ Revisionist

Zionists were the forerunners of the Likud party formed in 1973, which has ever since had the annexation of the West Bank under the biblical names of Judea and Samaria under the State of Israel on the agenda, while only a small minority in Israel today argues for the annexation of Jordan. In 1967, in addition to the Sinai and the Golan, Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza. In doing so, Israel controlled the entire territory of historic Palestine. Israel has sovereignty over all borders and occupies Gaza and the West Bank, which are annexed piece by piece in step with the expansion of Israeli settlements.

In fact, in Palestine today, there is one state, Israel, which has about 12 million inhabitants, 7 of whom have Israeli citizenship, while the remaining 5 million Palestinians, are without citizenship and have no political rights, but which since 1967 have lived under Israeli military occupation.³² Since the negotiations on the 1947 UN Partition Plan, there have been no negotiations on the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state. For example, the Oslo Process 'self-rule' (or 'autonomy') in the Oslo Accords referred to the limited self-governance of the Palestinian people under the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA). This was not full sovereignty or statehood, but rather a transitional arrangement meant to lead to a final status agreement but without defining final status as an establishing of a sovereign Palestinian state. When signing the so-called 'Roadmap for Peace' in 2003, which aimed to establish a Palestinian state after five years, Israel made fourteen reservations emphasising that Israel would not accept the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.³³ This view has been increasingly advanced by the current Israeli government, which, with the strong support of the Knesset, refuses to accept establishment of a Palestinian state thus refusing the so-called two-state solution.³⁴

The Jewish question

For centuries, Jews were persecuted, marginalised and oppressed in Europe. The problem grew considerably in connection with the development of the European nation-states, where Jews were seen as foreigners who could not be integrated into the new nations and thus posed a risk of conflict. Anti-Semitism, which in Christian Europe had been theologically justified, was now justified by xenophobia.³⁵ Therefore, in the United Kingdom (1904) and the United States (1924), austerity measures were implemented to prevent the immigration of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe.³⁶ Conversely, the persecution and oppression of the Jews was not compatible with the moral code of the new liberal-democratic nation-states, which were supposed to guarantee equal rights for all citizens regardless of religion and ethnicity. The

dilemma was debated as early as the 1800s under the heading ‘the Jewish question’.³⁷ The issue became radically acute after the Holocaust, but still neither the European states nor the United States would accept internally displaced Jews and Holocaust survivors, which is why there were up to one million Jewish refugees in Europe in internment camps after World War II.³⁸ This was the background for the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee. The solution to the Jewish question in Europe was the establishment of a Jewish state outside Europe and the United States, namely in Palestine even though the Arabs and the region had nothing to do with the European persecution of Jews and the Holocaust. Therefore, there was both resistance and anger among the Palestinians and Arabs that Palestine should provide land as a safe place for Jews persecuted and displaced in Europe, which led to the expulsion of 750,000 indigenous peoples and the Palestinian refugee problem.

This section has shown how Zionism’s transformation into state policy institutionalised demographic engineering as the foundation of Israel’s political order. Through occupation, settlement expansion and legal frameworks that exclude Palestinians from sovereignty and citizenship, the Zionist project produced a single state structure built on systematic displacement – a historical process examined further in the next section.

Gaza: then and now

Gaza’s history stretches back nearly four millennia. Archaeological and textual evidence indicates continuous settlement since at least the seventeenth century BCE.³⁹ Its location made it a key node connecting the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Levant, serving as a vital corridor between Egypt and the wider Arab East. When Alexander the Great besieged Gaza in 332 BCE on his campaign toward Egypt, both sides employed extensive tunnel systems, a reminder of Gaza’s enduring strategic importance.⁴⁰

During the Mamluk period (approximately 1250–1516 CE), Gaza flourished as a regional centre of learning and commerce and retained this role under the Ottoman Empire until the British conquest in 1917.⁴¹ British rule, followed by the 1948 Arab Israeli war, marked a sharp political and economic decline.

Gaza’s population grew from 80,000 to nearly 280,000 with the arrival of approximately 200,000 Palestinian refugees.⁴² From 1948 to 1967 the Gaza Strip remained under Egyptian control. Living conditions were constrained but comparatively stable.

Timeline. Displacement and transfer plans

Theodor Herzl notes in his diary about the Jewish takeover of Palestine: 'We must expropriate gently the private property on the estates assigned to us. We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our own country. The property owners will come over to our side. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly'.

After riots between Jews and native Palestinians at the Wailing Wall in 1929, Chaim Weizmann drew up plans and ideas for transfer, the Zionists' name for displacement, and discussed them with the British government.

Zionist leader Yosef Weitz begins work on drawing up plans for the transfer of Palestinians to neighbouring Arab countries.

Al-Nakba: Around 750,000 Palestinians are displaced out of Palestine and their possessions expropriated by Israel.

1895

1922

1930

1937

1938

1944

1948

1967

The British Mandate of Palestine is formally established and throughout the mandate period the Palestinians are refused to work in agriculture and companies controlled by the immigrated Jews. It continues until the end of the mandate in 1947.


The British Labour Party at its party congress supports the Zionists' plans for transfers.

David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann propose plans for 'voluntary transfer' and examine whether Arabs and Druze will move away if they are paid for it. The ideas of transfer are being discussed with Russian diplomats. The PEEL Commission proposes a two-state solution involving the transfer of 250,000 Palestinians from the designated territory of the Jewish state.

Between 280,000 and 325,000 Palestinians were displaced because of the Six-Day War. Around 145,000 were refugees from the 1948 war and were thus displaced for the second time. The Israeli colonisation of the West Bank, Golan, Sinai and Gaza began, leading to the expulsion of Palestinians from their houses and villages, as well as the destruction of agriculture.



1977 1979 1981 2002 2005 2009 2021 2022 2023



Demographic composition of Palestine 1517–1948

Table of Contest		Population of Israel/Palestine			Population of Jerusalem	
Era	Year	JEWS (core population)	Non-Jews	Total population	% Jewish	
Ottoman Empire	1517	5,000	295,000	~300,000	1.7%	
	1533-39	5,000	151,000	157,000	3.2%	
	1882	24,000	276,000	300,000	8.0%	
World War I	1914	94,000	595,000	689,000	13.6%	
	1918	60,000	600,000	660,000	9.1%	
British Mandate	1922	83,794	673,388	757,182	11.0%	
	1931	174,610	861,211	1,035,821	16.9%	
	1936	384,078	982,614	1,366,692	28.1%	
	1939	449,000	1,267,037			
	1946	543,000		1,810,037	30.0%	
	1947	630,000	1,324,000	1,970,000	32.0%	
State of Israel	1948	716,700	156,000*	872,000	82.1%	

Source: Jewish Virtual Library

Israel's occupation of Gaza began after the 1967 war. Over time, social and economic conditions deteriorated sharply under military rule. Popular frustration culminated in the First Intifada in December 1987, organised largely by young activists associated with emerging Islamist networks under Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. These networks later coalesced into Hamas.⁴³ Israel tolerated the rise of Hamas during the 1970s and 1980s, viewing it as a counterweight to the secular nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fatah.⁴⁴ This divide-and-rule approach has persisted until today. Under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Qatar was allowed to provide financial support to Hamas, reinforcing Gaza's separation from the West Bank and enabling Israel to argue that the Palestinians lacked a unified leadership.⁴⁵

Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections, which international observers judged free and fair, but the outcome was rejected by Israel, the United States and the European Union. Following internal conflict and failed reconciliation attempts, Hamas took full control of Gaza in 2007. Since then, Israel, in coordination with Egypt, has imposed a land, sea and air blockade. The restrictions have crippled economic activity and impeded reconstruction after repeated military offensives.⁴⁶

Israel and Hamas have engaged in several major rounds of conflict since the blockade began: 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021 and 2023–25. Casualty ratios have been consistently asymmetrical. In 2009, 13 Israelis and 1,417 Palestinians were killed; in 2012, 6 Israelis and 166 Palestinians; in 2014, 72 Israelis and 2,251 Palestinians; and in 2021, 15 Israelis and 256 Palestinians.⁴⁷ During the 2014 war alone, Israel conducted approximately 6,000 airstrikes that destroyed 18,000 homes and 73 health facilities and schools.⁴⁸

The blockade has had severe humanitarian consequences. Seawater intrusion has contaminated 90% of Gaza's drinking water, leading to widespread disease.⁴⁹ Nearly 40% of the population is under 14 years of age, making children the primary victims of repeated wars.⁵⁰ In 2012, the United Nations warned that Gaza could become uninhabitable by 2020 if living conditions did not improve.⁵¹

The comprehensive enclosure by land, air and sea effectively confines Gaza's residents. Scholars and humanitarian agencies have described the territory as 'the world's largest open-air prison'.⁵² With peace negotiations stalled since the failure of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's 2014 initiative, Gaza remains subject to periodic bombardment and economic strangulation, emblematic of a protracted policy of containment and displacement.

This section shows how Gaza's transformation from a historic crossroads of trade and culture into an isolated, devastated enclave reflects a long process of control and fragmentation. From occupation to blockade, Gaza's decline illustrates how containment and destruction became structural conditions shaping life in the territory. The next section examines how these dynamics have produced continuous and systemic displacement, only further exacerbated after 7 October 2023.

Smoke and flames rise from a tower building as it is destroyed by Israeli air strikes amid a flare-up of Israeli-Palestinian violence, in Gaza Strip, on May 13, 2021. Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib / Shutterstock.com.



A HISTORY OF DISPLACEMENT

The displacement of Palestinians in Gaza has been pursued through multiple strategies since 1948, ranging from direct expulsion to more insidious forms of coerced migration. These practices reflect broader colonial and settler-colonial logics aimed at depopulating Gaza and dissolving the refugee question. Forced displacement in Gaza is therefore not a recent phenomenon but a central and continuous feature of Palestinian history.



The displacement of Palestinians in Gaza has been pursued through multiple strategies since 1948, ranging from direct expulsion to more insidious forms of coerced migration.

The term Nakba ‘catastrophe’ refers to the mass expulsion of approximately 750,000 Palestinians by Israeli forces before and during the 1948 war surrounding the creation of Israel.⁵³ Around 200,000 of these refugees were driven into the small coastal area that became the Gaza Strip, and today more than 70% of Gaza’s population are their descendants.⁵⁴ Gaza’s borders were formalised in an armistice between Israel and Egypt, and from the outset the enclave’s existence was defined by displacement and containment.⁵⁵

In the early 1950s, United States and British-sponsored plans sought to resettle Palestinians from Gaza to Libya or Sinai under the guise of humanitarian relief, effectively dispersing refugees to weaken their collective claim to return.⁵⁶ These early schemes established a recurring pattern in which Palestinian displacement was treated as a logistical or demographic issue to be managed rather than a political injustice to be rectified.

The experience of mass displacement was repeated in 1967 during the Naksa 'setback', when approximately 280,000 Palestinians were displaced from Gaza and the West Bank following the Six-Day War.⁵⁷ For many Palestinians, these events constitute the 'ongoing Nakba', a continuous process of dispossession and fragmentation extending from 1948 to the present.⁵⁸ Scholars of settler colonialism identify this continuity as a structural logic of elimination rather than a series of isolated events.⁵⁹

After Israel's occupation of Gaza in 1967, displacement assumed more overtly colonial forms. The Allon Plan envisaged annexing parts of Gaza and transferring refugees elsewhere. More than 10,000 Palestinians were deported across the border into Sinai in the late 1960s, while further removals were curtailed only by international attention.⁶⁰ During the 1970s and 1980s, Israel established 'emigration offices' in Gaza's refugee camps, offering financial incentives to encourage out-migration. Approximately 20,000 Palestinians left through these programmes, fragmenting Gaza's social and family networks.⁶¹

Following the imposition of the blockade in 2007, displacement increasingly took the form of coerced out-migration and internal uprooting. Those granted permission to leave were often required to sign documents, relinquishing their right of return. As Procter (2024) argues, this represents 'coerced migration under siege', where mobility functions both as privilege and as social control.⁶² For most Gazans, displacement has become a cycle of forced immobility punctuated by periodic mass evacuations during military operations.

Since 2007, Israel, with Egypt's co-operation, has maintained a comprehensive land, sea and air blockade that restricts the movement of people and goods.⁶³ The United Nations has characterised this as collective punishment in violation of international law.⁶⁴ Repeated Israeli military operations in 2008–09, 2012, 2014 and 2021 produced mass displacement, with 500,000 people uprooted during the 2014 offensive alone, many of whom remained homeless for years due to restrictions on reconstruction⁶⁵ (OCHA, 2014; HRW, 2017). These cycles of destruction and

displacement created what the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre⁶⁶ called a 'slow-onset emergency', in which blockade, bombardment and economic collapse combined to generate permanent humanitarian displacement.

Across this period, the cumulative effect of repeated uprooting, restricted return and coerced migration reveals displacement as a long-term governance strategy. As Procter (2024) observes, Israel's siege policies have produced conditions so restrictive and unliveable that Palestinians are effectively pushed to leave, even as movement remains obstructed. Displacement in this sense is structural and politically engineered, functioning as a mechanism of demographic control and erasure.


Displacement after October 2023

Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, Israel's military campaign in Gaza produced near-total displacement, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and unprecedented restrictions on humanitarian access. In the first five months of the war, Israel dropped more than 25,000 tons of explosives on Gaza, which, the UN noted in a 2024 report, is equivalent to two nuclear bombs.⁶⁷ And in the last year, Israel escalated its multi-front aerial and ground attacks. United Nations agencies and international legal bodies, including the UN Human Rights Council and the International Commission of Jurists, have stated that Israel's actions may meet the legal threshold for genocide.⁶⁸ The International Association of Genocide Scholars (2024)⁶⁹ and prominent genocide scholars such as Segal⁷⁰ (2024), Bartov⁷¹ (2024) and Shaw⁷² (2024) have described Gaza as a 'textbook case of genocide', citing the combination of systematic bombardment, mass displacement and the weaponisation of starvation.

By December 2023, OCHA estimated that 1.7 million people, more than 80% of Gaza's population, were internally displaced.⁷³ Mass forced displacement was repetitive and layered, with families uprooted multiple times as bombardments and evacuation orders pushed civilians southward.⁷⁴ By May 2024, more than 90% of Gaza's population, about 1.9 million people, meaning almost everyone in Gaza had been displaced at least once, many five times or more.⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch documented this as a pattern of war crimes and possible ethnic cleansing, noting systematic attacks on homes, 'buffer zone' demolitions and forced evacuations.⁷⁶

Mortality during displacement has been unprecedented. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Israeli military offensive in the Gaza Strip has resulted in an average of about 100

Palestinians killed per day since October 2023.⁷⁷ Between October 2023 and July 2025, United Nations and independent monitoring sources recorded more than 57,000 Palestinians killed, including tens of thousands of women and children.⁷⁸ By late October 2025, estimates exceeded 68,000⁷⁹ according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, many studies, including one by The Lancet, argue the death toll could be 40% higher.⁸⁰ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification and the World Food Programme classified Gaza as experiencing famine in August 2025.⁸¹ Scholars such as Alex de Waal⁸² (2025) have identified starvation in Gaza as the deliberate use of hunger as a weapon of war, consistent with precedents in international criminal law.



By May 2024, more than 90% of Gaza's population, about 1.9 million people, meaning almost everyone in Gaza had been displaced at least once, many five times or more.

Evacuation orders have been central to this process. Oxfam reported in April 2025 that more than 500,000 people were ordered to evacuate within weeks, often into areas lacking food, water and shelter.⁸³ The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights⁸⁴ warned that these orders progressively erased civilian space in Gaza, concentrating the population into small, devastated zones. Aerial imagery published by The Washington Post in August 2025 revealed vast tent encampments, flattened neighbourhoods and compressed pockets of survivors surrounded by rubble.⁸⁵ Forensic Architecture (FA) and critical spatial analyses interpret these patterns as evidence of deliberate demographic engineering.⁸⁶

The convergence of these policies and discourses reinforces the argument, developed throughout this report, that displacement in Gaza is not an incidental by-product of war but a deliberate instrument of governance. Recognising the continuity between historical and contemporary displacement is essential for understanding the structural nature of Palestinian uprooting and its implications for international law and accountability.

Mechanisms of displacement

Forced displacement in Gaza since October 2023 has been carried out through interconnected military, administrative and humanitarian mechanisms. This section examines three key processes: (1) evacuation orders and forced transfers; (2) humanitarian containment through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF); and (3) economic and political schemes promoting incentivised relocation. Together,

these three mechanisms illustrate how displacement operates not as a temporary emergency response but as an intentional governance strategy embedded in the architecture of war and aid.

Evacuation orders and forced transfers

Evacuation orders issued by the Israeli military have been the most visible tool of mass displacement. They were distributed through leaflets from the sky, radio broadcasts and SMS messages, directing entire districts to relocate within impossibly short timeframes.⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch (2025) has concluded that Israel's policy of large-scale evacuation orders constitutes the war crime of forcible transfer under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute. Forensic Architecture (2024) documented recurring cycles of displacement, in which civilians ordered to move from one zone were later displaced again as those areas came under renewed attack. This pattern undermines Israel's claims of civilian protection and demonstrates systematic demographic control.⁸⁸

International humanitarian law allows the displacement of civilians only for imperative military reasons and requires their voluntary return once hostilities cease.⁸⁹ Yet as already mentioned, large parts of Gaza have been rendered uninhabitable through deliberate destruction of homes, hospitals and cultural sites.⁹⁰ Legal scholars argue that the cumulative effect of such policies constitutes ethnic cleansing and may amount to crimes against humanity.⁹¹ Evacuation orders therefore function not as protective measures but as mechanisms of population management and territorial restructuring.

Humanitarian containment and the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation

The establishment of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) in early 2024, created and backed by US and Israeli actors, exemplifies how humanitarian structures have been reconfigured to serve displacement objectives. Allegedly an aid initiative, the GHF replaced the UN-led relief system, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which has operated in Gaza since 1950, and started operating as the main channel for food and medical assistance.⁹² This shift occurred through deliberate misinformation campaigns, political pressure and targeted restrictions against UNRWA, aimed at discrediting the agency and dismantling its operational capacity. Rights groups and UN agencies describe the GHF as a displacement infrastructure designed to concentrate civilians in controlled southern zones while depopulating northern and central Gaza.⁹³

GHF's operations are tied to US-based logistics contractors such as Safe Reach Solutions and UG Solutions, both with backgrounds in military logistics.⁹⁴ Its four distribution hubs replaced over 400 former UNRWA sites, forcing civilians to move southward to access aid, imposing longer travel distances and heightened risks for civilians.⁹⁵ Humanitarian scholars identify this as a form of 'humanitarian containment', in which minimal relief is used to control movement rather than enable recovery.⁹⁶ Reports from Haaretz and France24 documented repeated attacks on civilians at or near these sites, with more than 1,000 Palestinians killed while seeking aid.⁹⁷

The concentration of aid into militarily designated 'humanitarian zones' transforms relief into a coercive tool of displacement. Scholars of famine have long shown that the denial of food and manipulation of aid access can constitute starvation as a method of warfare.⁹⁸ The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to food has warned that the Gaza case exemplifies starvation-induced displacement within a broader genocidal process (UNHRC, 2024).⁹⁹

Economic and political schemes promoting incentivised relocation

Proposals for post-war reconstruction reinforce the same displacement logic under economic guise. The 'Gaza Riviera' plan, attributed to US political advisers and modelled by the Boston Consulting Group, envisions Gaza as a high-end coastal zone under US trusteeship, where Palestinians are offered financial incentives to relocate abroad.¹⁰⁰ The plan includes cash payments and resettlement support conditioned on permanent departure, explicitly aiming to reduce the population and clear land for redevelopment.

This logic closely mirrors earlier 'transfer' proposals advanced by Zionist leaders in the 1930s, who likewise suggested financial compensation to persuade Palestinians and other non-Jewish residents to leave the country. Then as now, monetary inducement functioned as a veneer of voluntariness concealing underlying coercion, what scholars describe as 'economic displacement', in which financial incentives mask coercion.¹⁰¹

Recent iterations of this approach, including the Trump-backed 20-point 'Peace Plan for Gaza', 'Gaza Riviera' and 'AI smart cities' plan, revive this economic logic under the guise of reconstruction.¹⁰² Promoted by Jared Kushner, son-in-law to Donald Trump, the proposal envisions six to eight AI-powered cities along the coast and a phased Israeli withdrawal once an international security force assumes control. A joint UN, World Bank and EU assessment¹⁰³ estimated the recovery cost at USD 70

billion, with USD 20 billion needed in the first three years simply to restore basic services. Critics argue that such schemes transform reconstruction into real estate speculation, turning Gaza's ruins into a laboratory for ultra-rich investors and privatised redevelopment while effectively erasing and displacing its original population.

Linking aid, security and reconstruction to depopulation illustrates how economic, political and humanitarian instruments converge to render Palestinian presence temporary. Displacement becomes transactional, an outcome negotiated through promises of compensation rather than overt coercion. Together these mechanisms – evacuation, humanitarian containment and economic inducement – show that displacement in Gaza is not a chaotic by-product of war, but a structured, sustained policy embedded in military, administrative and financial systems. They demonstrate how governance and reconstruction now operate as instruments of territorial control, where survival and return are conditioned on acquiescence to displacement.

The same logic increasingly extends beyond Gaza. Similar patterns of coercive control, demographic engineering and displacement are now visible in the occupied West Bank and across Lebanon's southern border zones, indicating that what began in Gaza represents not an isolated tragedy, but a regional model of governance through dispossession.

Timeline. Israel's absent borders and the Green Line





Desert area of West Bank and palestinian towns and villages behind the West Bank separation wall in the background, Israel, Middle east. Photo: WhiteHaven / Shutterstock.com.

BEYOND GAZA: DISPLACEMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND LEBANON

The dynamics of displacement in Gaza cannot be understood in isolation. The processes of territorial fragmentation, militarised control and demographic engineering that define the Gaza strip form part of a broader regional pattern. This section examines how the anatomy of displacement linked to logics of forced displacement have expanded beyond Gaza – first into the West Bank, where Israel’s governance has increasingly mirrored the siege conditions of Gaza, and then into Lebanon, where displacement takes the form of regional spill-over. Together, these cases illustrate how the mechanisms of control described earlier extend across geographic boundaries, reinforcing the settler-colonial framework that underpins the entire structure of occupation.

The West Bank: Gazafication and the expansion of displacement

In recent years, but particularly since the escalation of hostilities on 7 October 2023, scholars, legal experts and human rights organisations have increasingly referred to a process of ‘Gazafication’ of the West Bank.¹⁰⁴ This term indicates the extension of governance practices long characteristic of the Gaza Strip – military siege, closure regimes, aerial bombardments and the systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure – into the occupied West Bank.¹⁰⁵ These include the use of armed drones for targeted killings, deployment of fighter jets in densely populated areas, large-scale raids on towns and refugee camps, and patterns of destruction that mirror the logics of urban warfare in Gaza.¹⁰⁶

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,¹⁰⁷ more than 40,000 Palestinians were internally displaced in the West Bank during 2025, the highest annual figure since the 1967 Six-Day War. This unprecedented displacement has been driven by a combination of factors: intensifying settler violence, increasing settlements, military demolitions, punitive home destructions, scorched-earth tactics, arson, mass arrests, killings and the militarisation of civilian spaces.¹⁰⁸ Many of these displacements are cyclical, as families expelled from one area are uprooted again elsewhere, echoing the patterns of recurrent displacement documented in Gaza.¹⁰⁹

The extremist right-wing government of Israel has simultaneously escalated both its rhetoric and policies toward the West Bank. Senior ministers have called openly for annexation and for the 'voluntary migration' of Palestinians, language that international legal scholars identify as a euphemism for ethnic cleansing.¹¹⁰ Settlement expansion has accelerated to unprecedented levels, with new outposts legalised retroactively and construction advancing deep inside Palestinian territory.¹¹¹ These settlements, often guarded by Israeli forces, have become epicentres of violence where armed settlers attack Palestinian residents and villagers with impunity.¹¹²

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory has warned that this convergence of policies – settler expansion, systemic violence and administrative fragmentation – is creating conditions 'designed to make life impossible for Palestinians in the West Bank'.¹¹³ In this sense, the Gazaification of the West Bank is not merely a rhetorical device but a material and legal process. The tactics of siege, collective punishment and forced displacement once confined to Gaza have become integral to Israel's governance across the occupied territories, reinforcing a unified system of demographic control and territorial consolidation.

The regional repercussions of these practices extend beyond the borders of historic Palestine. As displacement intensifies in Gaza and the West Bank, neighbouring states – particularly Lebanon – are increasingly drawn into the humanitarian and political consequences of this ongoing crisis. The following subsection examines how patterns of displacement intersect with Lebanon's own history of Palestinian exile and its current exposure to cross-border violence. Framing Lebanon as a site of both continuity and spill-over underscores that displacement in this context is not contained within national boundaries but operates as part of a regional architecture of control and exclusion.



Translation by authors: Residents of Ein Beit Elma camp. Aiding terrorism of any kind leads to the destruction of the camp. The lives of your children are your responsibility. You have been warned.



Translation by authors: To the residents of the camp. Israeli security forces continues to operate against terrorism in the camp. As long as terrorism exists - forces activity will continue.

Note: Flyers prepared by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) with evacuation orders distributed to Palestinians in various locations in the West Bank. Source: Israel Defence Forces, IDF.

Lebanon: regional spill-over and the politics of displacement

Lebanon represents the regional extension of the displacement dynamics observed in Gaza and the West Bank. The forced movements generated by Israeli military operations and regional escalation since 2023 have reverberated across the southern border, producing new waves of internal displacement while reactivating long-standing vulnerabilities in Lebanon’s political and humanitarian systems. This section draws on field interviews conducted in South Lebanon between June and August 2025, combined with secondary reports from UN agencies, municipalities and local organisations. The inclusion of interview material reflects the report’s broader aim of capturing the lived realities of displacement where official data are incomplete or delayed. While the analyses of Gaza and the West Bank rely primarily on secondary sources, the Lebanon section incorporates first-hand testimony to illustrate how local actors and communities experience and manage displacement in real time.

Lebanon sits at the crux of the Gaza war’s regional spill-over. Since 8 October 2023, cross-border hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon frontier have triggered large-scale internal displacement while deepening the country’s financial collapse and governance crisis. Southern Lebanon’s significance is fourfold: it borders the Blue Line with Israel; it is both a Hezbollah heartland and a mosaic of border communities; it bears layered scars of displacement (1978, 1982, 1993, 1996, 2006); and it lies where insecurity, humanitarian need and illicit flows converge amid weak state institutions.

The convergence is stark: close to one million people were displaced at some point since October 2023, with many cycling back during lulls only to flee again as front lines shifted. Tens of thousands remain unable or unwilling to return due to damage, explosive risks and the absence of guarantees. As one displaced woman from the border town of Houla explained in an interview in August 2025, 'We return for a few days when it's quiet, but we never unpack. The bag stays by the door because we know the shelling will start again'.¹¹⁴

Municipal leaders in the south describe the same uncertainty from the perspective of already overstretched institutions. An informant who volunteers with the Kfarkela Municipality in Marjayoun noted, 'We're managing rolling evacuations with no national plan. Schools became shelters for months; water and waste needs doubled while revenues collapsed. Families 'return' for a day, then drones or shelling push them out again'.¹¹⁵ These testimonies highlight how displacement in the south is not a singular event but a recurring cycle, where the absence of state planning and international humanitarian support forces both households and municipalities into a permanent mode of crisis management.

Displacement dynamics in South Lebanon

Displaced families from South Lebanon followed familiar routes as bombardments intensified. Many fled first to Saida and Tyre, while others sought shelter in Nabatieh's safer pockets, the Beirut–Greater Beirut area, the uplands of Chouf and Aley, or the Beqaa Valley. Sheltering took different forms: staying with relatives or renting in already crowded neighbourhoods, occupying public buildings and schools, and in some cases moving into collective sites managed by municipalities or UN agencies. By late 2024, the scale of displacement was such that many schools across the south were converted into temporary shelters, disrupting education for thousands of children. UNRWA and other partners intermittently opened facilities in Saida and Tyre as Israeli bombardments shifted, creating an unstable cycle of movement from one site to another.

The rhythm of flight and return since 2023 has echoed earlier patterns, particularly the war of 2006. Then, nearly one million people were displaced but many returned within weeks of the ceasefire. Today, intermittent ceasefires and renewed escalations make return precarious and often temporary. As one displaced teacher in Tyre explained in August 2025, 'Every time it feels calm enough to go back, another strike hits a road or field nearby. We never know if rebuilding will be wasted effort'.¹¹⁶ Families describe a pattern of 'testing returns', where they briefly return to assess damage or retrieve belongings before being pushed out again.

Municipalities and local organisations have carried much of the responsibility for these populations. Across the South, municipal leaders coordinated sheltering in schools and public buildings, while unions of municipalities improvised to maintain waste collection and water provision despite collapsing revenues. In Tyre and Saida, municipalities supported shelter setups and small-scale food initiatives, such as distributing seedlings to displaced households. NGOs and UN peacekeepers filled some of the gaps with medical supplies and ad hoc assistance, but these efforts were inconsistent and insufficient to meet growing needs. A municipal official from the Saida area reflected in August 2025, 'There is no national plan for us. Each time families arrive; we have to improvise with what we have. It is solidarity among neighbours that keeps people afloat, not the state'.¹¹⁷

These accounts highlight how displacement is experienced not only as physical movement but as a constant strain on fragile institutions and on communities asked to absorb wave after wave of uprooted families. The uncertainty of return, coupled with the absence of coordinated state planning, leaves both residents and municipalities trapped in a cycle of improvisation and endurance.

Displacement and national security dynamics

Cross-border strikes and militarisation reshaped the displacement landscape in South Lebanon from late 2023 onward. Aerial, artillery and drone attacks emptied entire localities, while successive 'evacuation' advisories and localised orders accelerated the pace of flight. Strikes extended beyond the border villages to Tyre and even Beirut's southern suburbs, damaging housing stock and essential services. The war's stop-start rhythm – pauses in fighting followed by sudden escalations – produced a cycle of movement that not only displaced families repeatedly but also created deep psychological strain. A municipal council member and humanitarian NGO staff member from Ain Ebel described the toll in August 2025: 'Every truce or temporary ceasefire is fragile. Families return with hope, but within days they are forced out again. This constant disruption breaks people more than the bombs themselves'.¹¹⁸

Hezbollah's role as both belligerent and welfare provider was also visible in displacement-affected areas. Its institutions, including Jihad al-Binaa and al-Qard al-Hassan, carried out early damage assessments and distributed compensation for rent and lost property, stepping into the vacuum left by absent state institutions. This mirrored the post-2006 dynamic in which non-state welfare provision alleviated immediate hardship but reinforced political loyalties and parallel governance

structures. One displaced woman from a southern border town explained in August 2025, 'They gave me enough to cover rent and replace some furniture. It helps us survive, but it reminds us who really takes care of us here'.¹¹⁹

At the same time, displacement intersected with tensions around UNIFIL's mandate and freedom of movement. Residents in several villages reported friction with peacekeepers, noting that patrols often arrived without explanation or coordination. A community leader from Marjayoun noted, 'People see soldiers on their roads but no services for their families. It creates anger and suspicion, not security'.¹²⁰ These strained optics highlight how displacement and militarisation overlap, complicating civilian-military relations in the South.

Population flight itself has become both a humanitarian consequence and a political tactic in a militarised border zone. Evacuations, targeted strikes and the delayed withdrawal of forces all influenced whether families could safely return, shaping patterns of control over terrain and civilian endurance thresholds. This has made displacement not only a survival strategy but also an element of political bargaining.

The broader debate over disarmament sharpened in mid-2025, with Hezbollah warning of internal strife if its weapons were challenged absent an end to Israeli attacks and clear security guarantees. For displaced civilians, these debates created further anxiety: political confrontation risks delaying reconstruction, prolonging insecurity and deepening divisions over who controls return and property recovery. As one displaced resident of Nabatieh explained in August 2025, 'We want to rebuild, not fight another battle over who controls our street'.¹²¹

These intersecting political and security dynamics directly affect patterns of displacement and return. The timing and extent of reconstruction assistance, the restoration of essential services and the perception of local stability are all mediated by Hezbollah's capacity and willingness to act. In areas where its welfare institutions are active, limited returns have occurred more quickly, while communities without such networks remain in prolonged displacement. As a result, the geography of return in South Lebanon mirrors the political geography of assistance, where access to support determines who can rebuild and when.

This uneven recovery underscores how displacement in Lebanon is shaped as much by post-conflict reconstruction policies as by the violence that caused it. The interdependence between military control, humanitarian aid and reconstruction generates spatial patterns that favour certain localities and delay others, reinforcing

divisions within the displaced population. In this sense, the politics of welfare and reconstruction become mechanisms through which displacement is managed and, in some cases, prolonged.

Ultimately, Lebanon's experience reveals how the management of displacement, return and reconstruction operates as an extension of conflict itself. The ability or failure to rebuild determines not only the material recovery of affected communities but also their political alignment and long-term settlement patterns. Displacement therefore persists beyond the cessation of hostilities, embedded in the very structures intended to resolve it.

EU and international engagement: migration control and containment

In May 2024, the European Commission pledged €1 billion in support to Lebanon for the period 2024 to 2027. The package included funding for basic services and resources for security actors responsible for border management and anti-smuggling operations. The first €500 million was released in August 2024, with Brussels explicitly linking the funds to reducing irregular sea departures, particularly toward Cyprus, and to exploring 'voluntary return' frameworks for displaced populations. This positioned Lebanon not only as a host country in crisis but also as a frontline partner in Europe's strategy to contain migration flows.

Lebanon's experience, however, must be understood within a longer continuum of displacement and containment. The country already hosts one of the highest numbers of refugees per capita in the world, including long-standing Palestinian communities and over a million Syrians displaced since 2011.¹²² In this context, the EU's containment logics are not new but build on earlier externalisation practices that shift the governance of mobility and displacement onto fragile states in the Global South. Similar dynamics have been documented in North Africa, where external funding and security co-operation have transformed humanitarian governance into instruments of control and deterrence.¹²³

While presented as stabilisation, this approach has had direct implications for displacement dynamics. By tying aid to migration control and border enforcement, the EU has reframed displacement as a security issue to be managed rather than a humanitarian or rights-based crisis to be resolved. In effect, the same containment logics evident in Gaza and the West Bank are extended into Lebanon's displacement landscape, reinforcing cycles of immobility, constrained return and structural precarity.

The emphasis on containment has generated concern within Lebanon. Rights advocates and humanitarian actors warned that directing large sums of money into a fragmented and politically captured state risks reinforcing patterns of externalisation that shift responsibility for migration management onto fragile states with weak accountability. A Beirut-based NGO worker reflected in August 2025, 'The EU speaks of protection, but the money is being tied to policing borders and pushing people back. Meanwhile, communities hosting the displaced are left with collapsing services'.¹²⁴

Regional analysts have echoed these concerns, noting that the EU deal coincided with Lebanon's most aggressive crackdown on Syrian refugees in years. Mass evictions, raids and deportations occurred alongside new border-management programmes, raising fears that European funds are indirectly supporting refolement. As one policy researcher at a Beirut think tank observed, 'Externalisation in Lebanon is not just ineffective, it is dangerous. It empowers the very actors who benefit from chaos and corruption. When the deal was signed, the same political figures remained in power, and that alone should have been a warning'.¹²⁵

Denmark's engagement has largely been channelled through EU mechanisms and humanitarian partners such as the Danish Refugee Council and UN agencies. Analysts have argued that any additional bilateral initiatives should include strict protection benchmarks and independent oversight. Without such safeguards, assistance aimed at stabilisation risks prolonging rather than resolving displacement.

European and Danish engagement in Lebanon therefore stands at a decisive point. A securitised focus on migration control risks deepening the very instability it seeks to contain. When aid is conditioned on border enforcement or framed around 'voluntary return', it may facilitate forced displacement and empower security actors whose actions exacerbate the crisis. As a Beirut-based policy analyst explained in August 2025, 'Externalisation looks tidy from Brussels, but on the ground, it fuels mistrust and strengthens those least accountable to civilians'.

This logic also affects internal displacement. In border regions most affected by the 2023 to 2025 conflict, EU-funded stabilisation measures have prioritised surveillance, fencing and military coordination over recovery for displaced communities. Such programmes may secure borders in the short term but leave Lebanese and Palestinian families in prolonged uncertainty, unable to rebuild or safely return.

Displacement becomes contained rather than resolved, producing what humanitarian scholars describe as 'frozen displacement' where mobility is restricted but long-term solutions remain out of reach.

A further risk lies in channelling reconstruction through opaque patronage networks. Large-scale recovery, if routed through sectarian systems or non-state intermediaries, can reproduce the post-2006 dynamic in which aid captured by political elites deepened dependency and polarisation. Without transparent municipal oversight, European funds risk consolidating parallel authorities rather than strengthening national institutions.

Despite these challenges, there are opportunities for constructive European engagement that support displaced communities rather than constrain them. Strengthening municipal governance through area-based recovery can improve accountability and responsiveness. Municipalities have borne the brunt of displacement management, from sheltering families to maintaining essential services, often without national assistance. Directing EU resources through transparent local mechanisms, combined with third-party monitoring, would empower these institutions and build community trust. As a municipal council member from Tyre explained in August 2025, 'If the EU wants its money to matter, it has to reach us directly. We are the ones keeping families afloat day to day, not the ministries'.

Linking aid to civilian-security dialogue platforms that connect displaced residents, local authorities, the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL can also reduce friction in border areas. Recovery efforts tied to livelihoods are equally vital. Programmes that restore housing, farms and small businesses allow displaced families to rebuild rather than remain dependent on emergency relief.

Ultimately, the EU's approach in Lebanon encapsulates a broader dilemma at the heart of international engagement with displacement. Policies built on containment may satisfy political imperatives in Europe but risk entrenching displacement and undermining stability on the ground. Recalibrating this strategy toward protection, accountability and local recovery would align European engagement with international law and humanitarian principles. More importantly, it would help transform displacement from a condition to be managed into a crisis to be genuinely resolved. This shift provides a bridge to the policy recommendations that follow, which outline concrete pathways for moving beyond containment toward durable solutions rooted in justice and accountability.



Sultanieh, South Lebanon, Lebanon. March 25, 2018.
Photo: Rayan090 / Shutterstock.com.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing displacement of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank reflects both historical continuity and an unprecedented intensification of coercive strategies. From the Nakba of 1948 through successive wars, blockades and the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, displacement has functioned as a structural instrument of political and demographic control. Since October 2023, large-scale evacuation orders, the dismantling of UNRWA's distribution network and the concentration of aid under the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation have transformed access to food, water and shelter into mechanisms of coercion. Starvation-induced displacement, repeated evacuations and attacks on civilians seeking aid illustrate a deliberate strategy of population management that legal and humanitarian experts identify as consistent with ethnic cleansing and genocide.

In the West Bank, similar dynamics of militarised displacement, settler violence and expansion, creeping annexation and administrative fragmentation reproduce the same structural logic. Civilian life is made increasingly untenable through targeted violence, demolitions and territorial fragmentation that prevent secure residence or return. These developments demonstrate that displacement is not a by-product of conflict, but a sustained governance mechanism and strategy embedded in broader systems of settler-colonial control.

The situation in Lebanon underscores how displacement extends beyond the immediate theatre of war. Here, regional instability, fragile governance and externalised migration control combine to produce cycles of protracted displacement and constrained mobility. The European Union's emphasis on containment, when tied to border management and 'voluntary return', risks transforming Lebanon into

a long-term holding space rather than a site of recovery. To prevent this, European and Danish engagement must integrate protection guarantees, transparency and local accountability into all assistance frameworks.

Taken together, these cases show that the Palestinian and regional displacement crisis cannot be addressed through humanitarian relief alone. Displacement must be understood and confronted as a structural and political condition requiring coordinated legal, institutional and policy responses.

POLICY RELEVANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis presented in this report demonstrates that displacement in Gaza, the West Bank and South Lebanon is not an episodic humanitarian emergency but a structural and politically engineered condition. However, these insights will only have practical effect if translated into clear, actionable policy guidance. This concluding section consolidates the report's key findings into a set of recommendations directed at policymakers, international organisations and donor governments.

■ **Recognition of displacement as structural, not incidental**

The report shows that displacement has functioned as a consistent strategy of governance, from the mass expulsions of 1948 and the forced movements of 1967 to the repeated uprooting of Gaza's population today. Policymakers must therefore recognise displacement as a deliberate and recurring outcome of political and military planning, not a collateral by-product of conflict. Only through such recognition can appropriate and durable responses be developed. This requires international institutions and donor governments to move beyond short-term relief and to address displacement as a structural condition requiring political redress, restitution and protection.

■ **Accountability of international actors**

External powers, including the United States, European states and the European Union, have contributed to sustaining displacement through arms transfers, diplomatic protection and conditional aid frameworks. These practices demand accountability. Arms transfers and security co-operation should be conditioned on strict compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. All aid packages must include independent monitoring mechanisms to prevent diversion or complicity in violations. Diplomatic initiatives should avoid legitimising coercive policies or shielding perpetrators from legal scrutiny. Without accountability, international engagement risks reinforcing the very dynamics it purports to mitigate.

■ **Critical reassessment of political frameworks**

Conventional frameworks such as the two-state solution, interim governance arrangements and so-called ‘voluntary migration’ schemes have repeatedly failed to resolve displacement and, in many instances, have normalised demographic engineering. Policymakers should therefore reassess these paradigms and move toward approaches that centre refugee rights, including the right of return, restitution and durable solutions consistent with international law. This shift requires political imagination beyond entrenched models that have accommodated, rather than challenged, structural displacement.

■ **The role of international law**

The report highlights the relevance of international legal instruments such as the Genocide Convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute. However, legal remedies alone are insufficient. Palestinian scholars, including Noura Erakat, Rabea Eghbariah and Mjriam Abu Samra, have demonstrated how international law has often failed to protect Palestinians, sometimes serving to entrench colonial structures rather than dismantle them. Policymakers must therefore both strengthen legal enforcement and confront the political obstacles that have historically impeded its application. International law remains a vital but contested arena, requiring sustained political will to ensure that its principles are not selectively applied.

■ **Practical mechanisms for implementation**

To make these recommendations operational, the following measures should be pursued:

- Establish independent accountability and monitoring mechanisms, including UN-mandated investigations, oversight of aid flows and conditionality clauses in arms and trade agreements.
- Develop alternative political frameworks that prioritise refugee rights, transitional justice and equality-based solutions, rather than perpetuating discredited models of conflict management.
- Strengthen international and domestic avenues for legal enforcement, including support for the International Criminal Court, universal jurisdiction cases and regional or national courts applying international law.

In short, this report calls for a fundamental shift in how displacement is understood and addressed. Displacement is not an accidental humanitarian crisis but a structural instrument of governance that demands recognition, accountability and rights-based redress. Only by treating it as such can international actors contribute to genuine protection, justice and the possibility of durable peace.

NOTES

- 1 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024.
- 2 Amnesty International, 'The Amnesty International Report on Genocide in Gaza', Amnesty International, 16 December 2024, <https://www.justsecurity.org/105629/amnesty-international-gaza-genocide-report/>
- 3 B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 2025. Our Genocide.
- 4 International Association of Genocide Scholars, IAGS Resolution on Gaza (2025), IAGS-Resolution-on-Gaza-FINAL.pdf
- 5 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and Israel (2025) ; Albanese, Francesca. 2025. From Economy of Occupation to Economy of Genocide: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (A/HRC/59/23). Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Right; Albanese, Francesca. 2024. Anatomy of a Genocide: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (A/HRC/55/73). Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- 6 Boyd van Dijk, 'Israel, Gaza, and the Starvation Weapon', Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2025, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israel-gaza-and-starvation-weapon>
- 7 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024.
- 8 Reuters, Timeline of Trump's Remarks on Palestinian Displacement, Gaza Takeover, 8 July 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trumps-remarks-plan-take-over-gaza-displace-palestinians-2025-02-20/>
- 9 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1125) (United Nations, 1994); Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, 'A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing', Foreign Affairs, 1 June 1993, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/1993-06-01/brief-history-ethnic-cleansing>; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 1998.
- 10 Gregory H. Stanton, 'The Ten Stages of Genocide', Genocide Watch, 2012, <https://www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages>
- 11 Zionist Organization officially changed name to World Zionist Organization in 1960.
- 12 Rashid Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017* (Metropolitan Books, 2020); Patrick Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409.
- 13 Irene L. Gendzier, *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East* (Columbia University Press, 2017); Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

- 14 Gendzier, *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*; Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*; Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oneworld, 2006); Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Avi Shlaim, *Genocide in Gaza: Israel's Long War on Palestine* (The Irish Pages Press, 2024); Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017*.
- 15 OCHA, *Occupied Palestinian Territory: Humanitarian Update* (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2024); United Nations Human Rights Council, *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and Israel*; Amnesty International, *'The Amnesty International Report on Genocide in Gaza'*.
- 16 OCHA, *Occupied Palestinian Territory: Humanitarian Update*.
- 17 Gendzier, *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*.
- 18 White House, *'Peace to Prosperity (Trump Plan)'*, 2020, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/peacetoprosperty/>
- 19 Johannes Due Enstad, *'De arabiske jødernes eksodus: bakgrunn og årsaker'*, *Babylon Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier*, no. 2 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.5617/ba.4266>
- 20 Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948*; Gendzier, *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*.
- 21 *The Times of Israel*, *PM Said to Tell MKs: Israel Destroying Homes in Gaza...*, 13 May 2025.
- 22 Wolfe, *'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native'*; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *Not a Nation of Immigrants: Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy, and a History of Erasure and Exclusion* (Beacon Press, 2021).
- 23 Wolfe, *'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native'*; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *Not a Nation of Immigrants: Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy, and a History of Erasure and Exclusion* (Beacon Press, 2021).
- 24 *The Jewish Chronicle*, *Smotrich-Trump Gaza Real Estate Bonanza, 2025*, <https://www.thejc.com/news/israel/smotrich-trump-gaza-real-estate-bonanza-gbmqf0j4>
- 25 Adam Kirsch, *On Settler Colonialism: Ideology, Violence, and Justice*, First edition (W. W. Norton & Company, 2024).
- 26 The report understands historic Palestine as the territory from the border with Lebanon and Syria in the north and in the south to the Sinai and the Gulf of Aqaba and east to west from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Historic Palestine was a province in Syria that was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1530 until the creation of the Middle East at the San Remo Conference in 1920 where it was decided that Palestine should be placed under a mandate under British rule. The British Palestine Mandate lasted until 1947 and in 1948 Israel unilaterally declared a state in the territory that was designated in the 1947 UN Partition Plan adopted in the UN General Assembly. The plan was never implemented because of resistance from the native population. Instead, Israel was unilaterally declared by the Jewish Society in Palestine in May 1948.
- 27 Lemkin, Raphael. 1944. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation; Analysis of Government; Proposals for Redress*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- 28 Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native'; Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017*; Tayseer Abu Odeh and Shahd Dibas, 'Zionist Settler-Colonialism and the Logic of Genocide in Gaza: A Conversation with Professor Avi Shlaim', *Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies* 24, no. 1 (2025): 17–36, <https://doi.org/10.3366/hlps.2025.0349>
- 29 Jeremy R. Hammond, *The Myth of the U.N. Creation of Israel* (2010), <https://www.jeremyrhammond.com/2010/10/26/the-myth-of-the-u-n-creation-of-israel/>
- 30 Abdel Monem Said Aly et al., *Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Bloomsbury, 2022), 56.
- 31 Derek J. Penslar, *Zionism: An Emotional State* (Rutgers University Press, 2023).
- 32 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), *Israel's Independence Day 2024 – Media Release No. 141/2024* (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024), https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/doclib/2024/141/11_24_141e.pdf; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), *Palestine in Figures 2024* (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024), <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2715.pdf>; B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, *A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This Is Apartheid* (B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 2022), https://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid; Human Rights Watch, *A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution* (Human Rights Watch, 2021), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution>
- 33 Government of Israel, *Israeli Cabinet Statement on Road Map and 14 Reservations* (2003).
- 34 *The Times of Israel*, 'Knesset Votes Overwhelmingly against Palestinian Statehood, Days before PM's US Trip', *The Times of Israel*, 18 July 2024, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-votes-overwhelmingly-against-palestinian-statehood-days-before-pms-us-trip/>
- 35 Morten Thing, *Jødehadets, Antijudaismens Og Antisemitismens Historie* (Solidaritet, 2024).
- 36 Gendzier, *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*.
- 37 David Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition* (W. W. Norton & Company, 2013).
- 38 Gendzier, *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*; David Nasaw, *The Last Million: Europe's Displaced Persons from World War to Cold War* (Penguin, 2021).
- 39 Jean-Pierre Filiu, 'Why Gaza Matters: Since Antiquity, the Territory Has Shaped the Quest for Power in the Middle East', *Why Gaza Matters*, 1 January 2024.
- 40 Filiu, 'Why Gaza Matters: Since Antiquity, the Territory Has Shaped the Quest for Power in the Middle East'.
- 41 Beshara B. Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (University of California Press, 1995).
- 42 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), *Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA for the Period 1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951* (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1951), <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/annual-report-director-1950-1951>
- 43 Filiu, 'Why Gaza Matters: Since Antiquity, the Territory Has Shaped the Quest for Power in the Middle East'.

- 44 Michael Scott-Baumann, *The Shortest History of Israel and Palestine* (The History Press, 2023).
- 45 OCHA, *Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2014* (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015).
- 46 OCHA, *Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2014*.
- 47 OCHA, 'Key Figures: 2014 Hostilities', 23 June 2015, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/key-figures-2014-hostilities>
- 48 OCHA, *Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2014*.
- 49 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), *Gaza Situation Report #90* (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 2022), <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/gaza-situation-report-90>
- 50 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), *Palestine in Figures 2024*.
- 51 United Nations Country Team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, *Gaza in 2020: A Liveable Place?* (2012), <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-197567/>
- 52 Ilana Feldman, 'Gaza as an Open-Air Prison', *Middle East Report*, no. 275 (2015), <https://merip.org/2015/06/gaza-as-an-open-air-prison/>; OCHA, *Occupied Palestinian Territory: Humanitarian Update*.
- 53 Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*; Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*.
- 54 Walid Khalidi, ed., *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Rosemary Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* (Zed Books, 1997).
- 55 Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (Bedford/St. Martin's, 2010); Leila Farsakh, *Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation* (Routledge, 2005).
- 56 Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration* (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*.
- 57 Nur Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory* (Zed Books, 2012); Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*.
- 58 Ahmad H. Sa'di and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds, *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory* (Columbia University Press, 2007), 416 Pages; Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017*.
- 59 Ilan Pappé, *The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge* (Verso Books, 2014); BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. 2022. *Survey of Palestinian Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons 2019-2021. Vol X. Bethlehem: BADIL*.
- 60 Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*; Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*.
- 61 Feldman, 'Gaza as an Open-Air Prison'.
- 62 Procter, Caitlin. 2024. 'Coerced Migration: Mobility under Siege in Gaza'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 50, no. 10: 2359-2383.

- 63 OCHA, Occupied Palestinian Territory: Humanitarian Needs Overview (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2023); Amnesty International, 'Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians: A Cruel System of Domination and a Crime against Humanity', Amnesty International, 1 February 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/>.
- 64 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of 15 Years of the Blockade - June 2022 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2022), <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022>; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade - July 2015 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015), https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/OCHA_BLOCKADE.pdf
- 65 OCHA, Gaza Crisis Appeal (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014).
- 66 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2024), <https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC-GRID-2024-Global-Report-on-Internal-Displacement.pdf>
- 67 United Nations Press, Fourth Committee Highlights Continuing Destruction in Gaza, Heightened Settler Violence, Emphasizing Need for Ceasefire, End to Illegal Occupation (United Nations, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/gaspd826.doc.htm>
- 68 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024.
- 69 International Association of Genocide Scholars. 2025. IAGS Resolution on Gaza.
- 70 Raz Segal, 'Gaza as a Textbook Case of Genocide'.
- 71 Bartov, Omer. 2024. 'As a former IDF soldier and historian of genocide, I was deeply disturbed by my recent visit to Israel'. The Guardian. 13 August 2024.
- 72 Shaw, M. (2025a). The Genocide that Changed the World. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 1–15.
- Shaw, M. (2025b). Gaza and the Structure of Genocide in Palestine. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 53(2), 416–422. Shaw, Martin. 2015. *What Is Genocide?* 2nd edn. Polity Press.
- 73 OCHA, Occupied Palestinian Territory: Humanitarian Needs Overview.
- 74 OCHA, Occupied Palestinian Territory: Situation Report (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2023).
- 75 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Internal Displacement Update: Gaza Strip – May 2024 (Norwegian Refugee Council / Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2024), <https://www.internal-displacement.org/>
- 76 Human Rights Watch, Hopeless, Starving, and Besieged: Israel's Forced Displacement of Palestinians in Gaza (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
- 77 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2024. Gaza: 40,000 Deaths and Counting – UN Rights Chief Says Civilian Cost 'Catastrophic'. Geneva: United Nations. August 15, 2024. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-40000deaths-turk-ohchr-15aug24/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- 78 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Casualty and Displacement Figures for Gaza and the West Bank (2025), <https://www.unrwa.org/>; The Washington Post, Names of Gaza's Child Victims, 2025.

- 79 CNN, Gaza Reckons with Ruins and Old Rivalries as Mediators Piece Together Wider Deal, 19 October 2025, <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/19/middleeast/gaza-ceasefire-palestinians-ruins-reconstruction-latam-intl>
- 80 OCHA, Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Update (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2025); Human Rights Watch, Starvation as a Method of Warfare in Gaza (Human Rights Watch, 2025); Reuters, Gaza War Toll Likely Significantly Undercounts Deaths, Says Study, 9 January 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-war-toll-likely-significantly-undercounts-deaths-says-study-2025-01-09/>; Rasha Khatib and et al., 'Counting the Dead in Gaza: Difficult but Essential', *The Lancet* 404, no. 10449 (2024): 237–38, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(24\)01169-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)01169-3)
- 81 IPC Famine Review Committee, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification: Gaza Strip (2025).
- 82 Alex de Waal, Starvation in Gaza, *London Review of Books Blog*, 14 May 2025, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2025/may/starvation-in-gaza>. Waal, Alex de. 1997. *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Indiana University Press; Waal, Alex de. 2018. *Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine*. Polity Press.
- 83 Oxfam International, Aid workers describe Gaza as 'stuff of nightmares' as Israel's mass forced displacements cause carnage and despair. 22nd April. (Oxfam International, 2025).
- 84 OHCHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025).
- 85 The Washington Post, Aerial Imagery Reveals Gaza's Devastation, 2 August 2025.
- 86 Forensic Architecture. 2024. Humanitarian Violence. Israel's Abuse of Preventative Measures in its 2023-2024 Campaign: Warnings, Evacuation Orders, 'Safe Routes' and 'Safe Zones' in the Gaza Strip. (Forensic Architecture, 2024); Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (Verso, 2017); Sara Fregonese, *War and the City: Urban Geopolitics in Lebanon* (Routledge, 2019).
- 87 Human Rights Watch, Hopeless, Starving, and Besieged: Israel's Forced Displacement of Palestinians in Gaza; Oxfam International, Aid workers describe Gaza as 'stuff of nightmares' as Israel's mass forced displacements cause carnage and despair; OCHA, Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Update.
- 88 Forensic Architecture, 2024. Humanitarian Violence. Israel's Abuse of Preventative Measures in its 2023-2024 Campaign: Warnings, Evacuation Orders, 'Safe Routes' and 'Safe Zones' in the Gaza Strip.
- 89 International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (ICRC, 2016); John Quigley, Quigley, John. 2024. 'Slow Death' as Genocide: The Convention Was Written for Gaza. *Opinio Juris*, 14 October.
- 90 Amnesty International, 'The Amnesty International Report on Genocide in Gaza'; Human Rights Watch, Starvation as a Method of Warfare in Gaza.
- 91 'Eghbariah, Rabea. 2023. 'The Ongoing Nakba: Toward a Legal Framework for Palestine'. N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change: *The Harbinger* 48: 94; Akram, Susan, and John Quigley. 2024. 'Is International Law Still Relevant after the Carnage in Gaza?' Arab Center Washington DC, April 23, 2024.

- 92 France 24, Blood for Food: US Soldiers, Spies Sideline UN Aid Work in Gaza, 3 July 2025; The Guardian, Rights groups warn Gaza Humanitarian Foundation it may be liable for international law violations, 23 June 2025.
- 93 Human Rights Watch, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in Gaza (Human Rights Watch, 2025); OHCHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
- 94 France 24, Blood for Food: US Soldiers, Spies Sideline UN Aid Work in Gaza.
- 95 Haaretz. 2025. 'It's a Killing Field': IDF Soldiers Ordered to Shoot Deliberately at Unarmed Gazans Waiting for Humanitarian Aid. June 27.
- 96 Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (University of California Press, 2012); Michel Agier, *Managing the Undesirables* (Polity, 2011).
- 97 Oxfam International, Aid workers describe Gaza as 'stuff of nightmares' as Israel's mass forced displacements cause carnage and despair, 2025; The Guardian, Rights groups warn Gaza Humanitarian Foundation it may be liable for international law violations, 2025.
- 98 Alex de Waal, *Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine* (Polity Press, 2015); Waal, Alex de. 2025. Starvation in Gaza. 14 May. International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds, *Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I – Rules* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- 99 HCR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967 (2025), <https://www.ohchr.org>.
- 100 The Guardian, Leaked 'Gaza Riviera' Plan Dismissed as 'Insane' Attempt to Cover Ethnic Cleansing, 1 September 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/01/leaked-gaza-riviera-plan-dismissed-as-insane-attempt-to-cover-ethnic-cleansing>
- 101 Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (Zed Books, 2014); Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*; Alex de Waal, Starvation in Gaza. 14 May 2025.
- 102 CNN, Gaza Reckons with Ruins and Old Rivalries as Mediators Piece Together Wider Deal.
- 103 World Bank et al., *Gaza and West Bank: Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment* (World Bank Group, 2025), <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/133c3304e29086819c1119fe8e85366b-0280012025/original/Gaza-RDNA-final-med.pdf>
- 104 Tareq Baconi, 'Gaza and the One-State Reality', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 50, no. 1(197) (2021): 77–90.
- 105 Eghbariah, Rabea. 2023. 'The Ongoing Nakba: Toward a Legal Framework for Palestine'; Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*.
- 106 Human Rights Watch, *Israel Imports Gaza Abuses into the West Bank* (Human Rights Watch, 2025); Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*;
- 107 OCHA, *Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Update*.
- 108 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, *Casualty and Displacement Figures for Gaza and the West Bank*.
- 109 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *The Ongoing Nakba: Annual Survey of Palestinian Displacement*; Quigley, John. 2024. 'Slow Death' as Genocide: The Convention Was Written for Gaza. *Opinio Juris*, 14 October.

- 110 Segal, 'Gaza as a Textbook Case of Genocide'.
- 111 Peace Now, Settlement Watch: Annual Construction and Expansion Report (Peace Now, 2025), <https://peacenow.org.il/en/tag/settlement-watch>
- 112 Amnesty International, 'The Amnesty International Report on Genocide in Gaza'; Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights, Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the West Bank (Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights, 2025).
- 113 OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025).
- 114 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 115 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 116 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 117 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 118 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 119 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 120 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 121 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 122 Andersen, Lars Erslev. 2020. 'No Future for the Palestinians in Lebanon: Power Sharing, Political Stagnancy and Securitisation of (Palestinian) Migration'. In *Cosmopolitanism, Migration and Universal Human Rights*. Springer Nature.
- 123 Ahlam Chemlali, The EU Is Fuelling Migration from Tunisia, Not Stopping It, 4 July 2023, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/07/04/eu-fuelling-migration-tunisia-not-stopping-it?utm_content=buffer03160&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer; Ahlam Chemlali, 'Rings in the Water: Felt Externalisation and Its Rippling Effect in the Extended EU Borderlands', *Geopolitics* 29, no. 3 (2024): 873–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2023.2198125>; Ahlam Chemlali, 'Treading Water in Transit: Understanding Gendered Stuckness and Movement in Tunisia', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 50, no. 20 (2024): 5210–27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2024.2312226>
- 124 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.
- 125 'Interview August 2025', August 2025.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albanese, Francesca. 2024. *Anatomy of a Genocide: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (A/HRC/55/73)*. Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/anatomy-of-a-genocide-report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-palestinian-territory-occupied-since-1967-to-human-rights-council-advance-unedited-version-a-hrc-55/>

Albanese, Francesca. 2025. *From Economy of Occupation to Economy of Genocide: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (A/HRC/59/23)*. Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford University Press.

Agier, Michel. 2011. *Managing the Undesirables*. Polity.

Akram, Susan, and John Quigley. 2024. Is International Law Still Relevant after the Carnage in Gaza? *Arab Center Washington DC*, April 23. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/international-law-still-relevant-after-the-carnage-in-gaza/>

Amnesty International. 2015. State of Palestine: Unlawful and Deadly: Rocket and Mortar Attacks by Palestinian Armed Groups during the 2014 Gaza/Israel Conflict. *Amnesty International*, March 26. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde21/1178/2015/en/>.

Amnesty International. 2022. Israel's Apartheid against Palestinians: A Cruel System of Domination and a Crime against Humanity. *Amnesty International*, February 1. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/>

Amnesty International. 2024. Mass Forced Displacement in Gaza Highlights Urgent Need for Israel to Uphold Palestinians' Right to Return. *Amnesty International*, May 14. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/05/mass-forced-displacement-in-gaza-highlights-urgent-need-for-israel-to-uphold-palestinians-right-to-return/>

Amnesty International. 2025. As Mass Starvation Spreads across Gaza, Our Colleagues and Those We Serve Are Wasting Away. *Amnesty International*, July 23. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/07/as-mass-starvation-spreads-across-gaza-our-colleagues-and-those-we-serve-are-wasting-away/>

Amnesty International. 2024. The Amnesty International Report on Genocide in Gaza. *Amnesty International*, December 16. <https://www.justsecurity.org/105629/amnesty-international-gaza-genocide-report/>

Andersen, Lars Erslev. 2020. No Future for the Palestinians in Lebanon: Power Sharing, Political Stagnancy and Securitisation of (Palestinian) Migration. In Mogens Chrom Jacobsen, Emmet Beranu, Drago Zuparic-Iljic eds. 2020: *Cosmopolitanism, Migration and Universal Human Rights*. Springer Nature: 47-59. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50645-2_5

Baconi, Tareq. 2021. Gaza and the One-State Reality. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 50 (1(197)): 77–90.

- BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. 2022. *Survey of Palestinian Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons 2019-2021. Vol X. Bethlehem: BADIL*. https://badil.org/cached_uploads/view/2022/10/31/survey2021-eng-1667209836.pdf
- Bartov, Omer. 2024. As a former IDF soldier and historian of genocide, I was deeply disturbed by my recent visit to Israel. *The Guardian*. 13 August 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/13/israel-gaza-historian-omer-bartov>
- Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew. 1993. A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing. *Foreign Affairs*, June 1. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/1993-06-01/brief-history-ethnic-cleansing>
- B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 2025. Our Genocide. https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/publications/202507_our_genocide_eng.pdf
- B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 2022. A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This Is Apartheid. https://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid
- Chemlali, Ahlam. 2023. The EU Is Fuelling Migration from Tunisia, Not Stopping It. July 4. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/07/04/eu-fuelling-migration-tunisia-not-stopping-it?utm_content=buffer03160&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
- Chemlali, Ahlam. 2024a. Rings in the Water: Felt Externalisation and Its Rippling Effect in the Extended EU Borderlands. *Geopolitics* 29(3): 873–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2023.2198125>
- Chemlali, Ahlam. 2024b. Treading Water in Transit: Understanding Gendered Stuckness and Movement in Tunisia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 50(20): 5210–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2024.2312226>
- CNN. 2025. Gaza Reckons with Ruins and Old Rivalries as Mediators Piece Together Wider Deal. October 19. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/10/19/middleeast/gaza-ceasefire-palestinians-ruins-reconstruction-latam-intl>
- Convention between the United States and Great Britain; Rights in Palestine*. 1924. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1924v02/ch10>
- Davidson, Lawrence. 2001. *America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood*. University Press of Florida.
- Dijk, Boyd van. 2025. Israel, Gaza, and the Starvation Weapon. *Foreign Affairs*, April 30. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israel-gaza-and-starvation-weapon>
- Doumani, Beshara B. 1995. *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900*. University of California Press.
- Duffield, Mark. 2014. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. Zed Books.
- Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne. 2021. *Not a Nation of Immigrants: Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy, and a History of Erasure and Exclusion*. Beacon Press.
- Eghbariah, Rabea. 2023. The Ongoing Nakba: Toward a Legal Framework for Palestine. *N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change: The Harbinger* 48: 94 https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Rabea_RLSC-The-Harbinger_Volume-48-Piece-updated-2.25-1.pdf

- Enstad, Johannes Due. 2010. De arabiske jødernes eksodus: bakgrunn og årsaker. *Babylon Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier*, no. 2. <https://doi.org/10.5617/ba.4266>
- Farsakh, Leila. 2005. *Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation*. Routledge.
- Fassin, Didier. 2012. *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*. University of California Press.
- Feldman, Ilana. 2015a. Gaza as an Open-Air Prison. *Middle East Report* 275. <https://merip.org/2015/06/gaza-as-an-open-air-prison/>
- Feldman, Ilana. 2015b. *Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics*. University of California Press.
- Ferris, Elizabeth. 2011. *The Politics of Protection: The Limits of Humanitarian Action*. Brookings Institution Press.
- Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona, eds. 2014. Introduction: Refugee and Forced Migration studies in Transition. In: *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*. Oxford University Press.
- Filiu, Jean-Pierre. 2024. Why Gaza Matters: Since Antiquity, the Territory Has Shaped the Quest for Power in the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs*, January 1. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/why-gaza-matters>
- Financial Times. 2025. Inside Israel's 'Gazafication' of the West Bank. May 4. <https://www.ft.com/content/93077988-2dea-42da-989a-bada3c5e7442>
- Flapan, Simha. 1987. *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*. Pantheon Books.
- Forensic Architecture. 2024. Humanitarian Violence. *Israel's Abuse of Preventative Measures in its 2023-2024 Campaign: Warnings, Evacuation Orders, 'Safe Routes' and 'Safe Zones' in the Gaza Strip*. Research report. London: Forensic Architecture. https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Humanitarian-Violence_Report_FA.pdf
- France 24. 2025. *Blood for Food: US Soldiers, Spies Sideline UN Aid Work in Gaza*. July 3. <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250703-blood-for-food-us-soldier-spies-sideline-un-aid-work-gaza-ghf-safe-reach>
- Fregonese, Sara. 2019. *War and the City: Urban Geopolitics in Lebanon*. Routledge.
- Gendzier, Irene L. 2017. *Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of U.S. Policy in the Middle East*. Columbia University Press.
- Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. 2018. *Hand on the Switch – Who's responsible for Gaza's infrastructure crisis?* Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. <https://gisha.org/en/hand-on-the-switch-whos-responsible-for-gazas-infrastructure-crisis/>
- Government of Israel. 2003. *Israeli Cabinet Statement on Road Map and 14 Reservations*. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-cabinet-statement-on-road-map-and-14-reservations>
- Haaretz. 2025. 'It's a Killing Field': IDF Soldiers Ordered to Shoot Deliberately at Unarmed Gazans Waiting for Humanitarian Aid. June 27. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-soldiers-ordered-to-shoot-deliberately-at-unarmed-gazans-waiting-for-humanitarian-aid/00000197-ad8e-de01-a39f-ffb33780000>

- Hammond, Jeremy R. 2010. *The Myth of the U.N. Creation of Israel*. *Foreign Policy Journal*, October 26. <https://www.jeremyhammond.com/2010/10/26/the-myth-of-the-u-n-creation-of-israel/>
- Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds. 2005. *Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I – Rules*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffman, Bruce. 2016. *Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917-1947*. Vintage.
- Hourani, Albert. 2005. The Case against a Jewish State in Palestine: Albert Hourani's Statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry of 1946. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35(1): 80–90. <https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2005.35.1.80>
- Human Rights Watch. 2020. Israel and Palestine: Events of 2020. In *World Report 2021*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/israel-and-palestine>
- Human Rights Watch. 2024. *Hopeless, Starving, and Besieged: Israel's Forced Displacement of Palestinians in Gaza*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/11/14/hopeless-starving-and-besieged/israels-forced-displacement-palestinians-gaza>
- Human Rights Watch. 2025. *Israel Imports Gaza Abuses into the West Bank*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/26/israel-imports-gaza-abuses-west-bank>
- Human Rights Watch. 2025a. *Israel's Crimes Against Humanity in Gaza*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/14/israels-crimes-against-humanity-gaza>
- Human Rights Watch. 2023. *Israel Weaponizing Starvation*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/18/israel-starvation-used-weapon-war-gaza>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2014. *Under Fire: Israel's enforcement of Access Restricted Areas in the Gaza Strip*. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. <https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201402-me-palestine-under-fire-report-en.pdf>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2024. *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024: Spotlight on Palestine*. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 2024. *Internal Displacement Update: Gaza Strip – May 2024*. Norwegian Refugee Council / Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/>
- International Association of Genocide Scholars. 2025. *IAGS Resolution on Gaza*. IAGS-Resolution-on-Gaza-FINAL.pdf
- International Committee of the Red Cross. 2016. *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)*. ICRC. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949>
- International Court of Justice. 2024. *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024*. The Hague: International Court of Justice. <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-pre-01-00-en.pdf>
- International Criminal Court. 1998. *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf>

International Criminal Court. 2011. *Elements of Crimes (2011 Edition)*. The Hague: International Criminal Court. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf>

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2003. *Selected Judgments (Mucić, Naletilić & Martinović, Krstić, Brđanin, Stakić)*.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee. 2025. *Famine Review Committee Report: Gaza Strip*, August 2025. August. Geneva: IPC Global Initiative. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_Gaza_Aug2025.pdf

Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 2024. *Israel's Independence Day 2024 – Media Release No. 141/2024*. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/doclib/2024/141/11_24_141e.pdf

Jewish Virtual Library. 1953. *Immigrants to Israel: 1948-1952*. July. <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/immigrants-to-israel-1948-1952>

Kälin, Walter. 2008. *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations*. American Society of International Law.

Kaplan, Amy. 2018. *Our American Israel: The Story of an Entangled Alliance*. 1st ed. Harvard University Press. <https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674989917>

Khalidi, Rashid. 2020. *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017*. Metropolitan Books.

Khalidi, Walid. 1988. Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18(1): 4–70.

Khalidi, Walid, ed. 1992. *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*. Institute for Palestine Studies.

Khalili, Laleh. 2007. *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration*. Cambridge University Press.

Khatib, Rasha et al. 2024. Counting the Dead in Gaza: Difficult but Essential. *The Lancet* 404 (10449): 237–38. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(24\)01169-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)01169-3)

Kirsch, Adam. 2024. *On Settler Colonialism: Ideology, Violence, and Justice*. 1st ed. W. W. Norton & Company.

Lemkin, Raphael. 1944. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation; Analysis of Government; Proposals for Redress*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Little, Douglas. 2002. *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. The University of North Carolina Press.

Masalha, Nur. 1992. *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948*. Institute for Palestine Studies.

Masalha, Nur. 2012. *The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory*. Zed Books.

McAlister, Melani. 2001. *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000*. University of California Press.

- Morris, Benny. 2004. *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*. Cambridge University Press.
- Moses, A. Dirk. 2021. *The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nasaw, David. 2021. *The Last Million: Europe's Displaced Persons from World War to Cold War*. Penguin.
- Nirenberg, David. 2013. *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition*. W. W. Norton & Company.
- OCHA. 2014. *Gaza Crisis Appeal*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
- OCHA. 2015a. *Fragmented Lives: Humanitarian Overview 2014*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/Annual_Humanitarian_Overview_2014_English_final.pdf
- OCHA. 2015b. Key Figures: 2014 Hostilities. June 23. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/key-figures-2014-hostilities>
- OCHA. 2016. *Gaza: Two Years After the 2014 Hostilities*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-two-years-2014-hostilities-august-2016>
- OCHA. 2023. *Occupied Palestinian Territory: Humanitarian Needs Overview*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/HNO_2023.pdf
- OCHA. 2025a. Data on Demolitions and Displacement in the West Bank. October 28. <https://www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition>
- OCHA. 2025b. *Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Update*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. October 22. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-334-gaza-strip>
- Odeh, Tayseer Abu, and Shahd Dibas. 2025. Zionist Settler-Colonialism and the Logic of Genocide in Gaza: A Conversation with Professor Avi Shlaim. *Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies* 24(1): 17–36. <https://doi.org/10.3366/hlps.2025.0349>
- OHCHR. 2025. *Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Obligation to Ensure Accountability and Justice (Report A/HRC/58/28)*. Geneva: United Nations. <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/28>
- Oren, Michael B. 2007. *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present*. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Oxfam International. 2025a. *Palestinians pushed into deeper crisis with Israeli displacement order on entire Gaza City. 9 September*. <https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/palestinians-pushed-into-deeper-crisis-with-israeli-displacement-order-on-entire-gaza-city-oxfam/>
- Oxfam International. 2025. *Aid Workers Describe Gaza as 'Stuff of Nightmares' as Israel's Mass Forced Displacements Cause Carnage and Despair. 22 April*. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/aid-workers-describe-gaza-stuff-nightmares-israels-mass-forced-displacements-cause>

- Oxfam International. 2024. *Compelled to Flee: Cycles of Israeli Forced Displacement of Palestinians*. 3 April. Oxfam International and ActionAid. https://oxfam.dk/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/compelled-to-flee_cycles-of-israelig-forced-displacement-of-palestinians_report_2024.pdf
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). 2024. *Palestine in Figures 2024*. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2715.pdf>
- Pappé, Ilan. 2006. *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. Oneworld.
- Pappé, Ilan. 2014. *The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge*. Verso Books.
- Peace Now. 2025. *Settlement Watch: Annual Construction and Expansion Report*. Peace Now. <https://peacenow.org.il/en/tag/settlement-watch>
- Penslar, Derek J. 2023. *Zionism: An Emotional State*. Rutgers University Press.
- Procter, Caitlin. 2024. Coerced Migration: Mobility under Siege in Gaza. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 50(10): 2359–2383.
- Prunier, Gérard. 2005. *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. Cornell University Press.
- Quigley, John. 2024. *Slow Death' as Genocide: The Convention Was Written for Gaza*. *Opinio Juris*, 14 October. <https://opiniojuris.org/2024/10/14/slow-death-as-genocide-the-convention-was-written-for-gaza/>
- Raheb, Mitri. 2021. *The Politics of Persecution*. Baylor University Press.
- Reuters. 2025a. *Gaza War Toll Likely Significantly Undercounts Deaths, Says Study*. 9 January 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-war-toll-likely-significantly-undercounts-deaths-says-study-2025-01-09/>
- Reuters. 2025b. *Timeline of Trump's Remarks on Palestinian Displacement, Gaza Takeover*. 8 July 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trumps-remarks-plan-take-over-gaza-displace-palestinians-2025-02-20/>
- Roy, Sara. 2016. *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development*. 3rd ed. Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Sa'di, Ahmad H., and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds. 2007. *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory*. Columbia University Press.
- Said Aly, Abdel Monem, Shai Feldman, and Khalil Shikaki. 2022. *Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East*. Bloomsbury.
- Sayigh, Rosemary. 1997. *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*. Zed Books.
- Scott-Baumann, Michael. 2023. *The Shortest History of Israel and Palestine*. The History Press.
- Segal, Raz. 2024. Gaza as a Textbook Case of Genocide. *Jewish Currents*. 13 October 2023. <https://jewishcurrents.org/a-textbook-case-of-genocide>
- Shavit, Ari. 2013. *My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel*. First edition. Spiegel & Grau.
- Shaw, Martin. 2015. *What Is Genocide?* 2nd ed. Polity Press.

- Shaw, M. (2025a). The Genocide that Changed the World. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2025.2556575>
- Shaw, M. (2025b). Gaza and the Structure of Genocide in Palestine. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 53(2), 416–422. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2025.2493304>
- Shlaim, Avi. 2024. *Genocide in Gaza: Israel's Long War on Palestine*. The Irish Pages Press.
- Slim, Hugo. 2015. *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster*. Oxford University Press.
- Smith, Charles D. 2010. *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*. Bedford/St. Martin's.
- Stanton, Gregory H. 2012. The Ten Stages of Genocide. Genocide Watch. <https://www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages>.
- Stein, Leonard. 1983. *The Balfour Declaration*. Magnes Press.
- Terry, Fiona. 2002. *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*. Cornell University Press.
- The Guardian. 2025a. Rights groups warn Gaza Humanitarian Foundation it may be liable for international law violations. 23 June. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/23/gaza-humanitarian-foundation-israel-human-rights-groups>
- The Guardian. 2025b. *Leaked 'Gaza Riviera' Plan Dismissed as 'Insane' Attempt to Cover Ethnic Cleansing*. 1 September. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/01/leaked-gaza-riviera-plan-dismissed-as-insane-attempt-to-cover-ethnic-cleansing>
- The Jerusalem Post. 2025. *US D-9 Bulldozers Worth Billions of Shekels Arrive in Israel after Trump Admin. Releases Shipment*. July 9. <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-860489>
- The Jewish Chronicle. 2025. *Smotrich-Trump Gaza Real Estate Bonanza*. <https://www.thejc.com/news/israel/smotrich-trump-gaza-real-estate-bonanza-gbmqf0j4>
- The Times of Israel. 2024a. *Knesset Overwhelmingly Passes Motion Rejecting Palestinian Statehood...* July 18. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/knesset-overwhelmingly-passes-motion-rejecting-palestinian-statehood-days-before-pms-us-trip/
- The Times of Israel. 2024b. 'Knesset Votes Overwhelmingly against Palestinian Statehood, Days before PM's US Trip'. *The Times of Israel*, July 18. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-votes-overwhelmingly-against-palestinian-statehood-days-before-pms-us-trip/>
- The Times of Israel. 2025. *PM Said to Tell MKs: Israel Destroying Homes in Gaza so Palestinians have nowhere else to go but outside the Strip*. May 13. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/pm-said-to-tell-mks-israel-destroying-homes-in-gaza-so-palestinians-have-nowhere-else-to-go-but-outside-the-strip/
- The Washington Post. 2025a. *Aerial Imagery Reveals Gaza's Devastation*. August 2. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2025/gaza-war-destruction-aerial-airdrop/>
- The Washington Post. 2025b. *Names of Gaza's Child Victims*. Date? <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2025/israel-gaza-war-children-death-toll/>
- Thing, Morten. 2024. *Jødehadets, Antijudaismens Og Antisemitismens Historie*. Solidaritet.

- Thompson, Elizabeth F. 2020. *How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs: The Syrian Congress of 1920 and the Destruction of Its Historic Liberal-Islamic Alliance*. Grove Press.
- United Nations. 1977. *Protocol Additional I and II to the Geneva Conventions*. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977>
- United Nations. 1998. *UNHCR: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/idps/43ce1cff2/guiding-principles-internal-displacement.html>
- United Nations. 2005. *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur*. <https://undocs.org/S/2005/60>
- United Nations Country Team in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 2012. *Gaza in 2020: A Liveable Place?* <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-197567/>
- United Nations Human Rights Council. 2025. *Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and Israel*. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session60/advance-version/a-hrc-60-crp-3.pdf>
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2025. *West Bank Humanitarian Impact Update*. <https://www.ochaopt.org>
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2015. *Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade - July 2015*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/OCHA_BLOCKADE.pdf
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2022. *Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of 15 Years of the Blockade - June 2022*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022>
- United Nations Press. 2024. *Fourth Committee Highlights Continuing Destruction in Gaza, Heightened Settler Violence, Emphasizing Need for Ceasefire, End to Illegal Occupation*. United Nations. <https://press.un.org/en/2024/gaspd826.doc.htm>
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 2025. *Casualty and Displacement Figures for Gaza and the West Bank*. <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-192-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem>
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 1951. *Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA for the Period 1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951*. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/annual-report-director-1950-1951>
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 2022. *Gaza Situation Report #90*. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. <https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/gaza-situation-report-90>
- United Nations Security Council. 1994. *Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1125)*. United Nations. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4F-F96FF9%7D/s_1994_1125.pdf

- United Nations Security Council. 2018. *Resolution 2417 (2018): Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Conflict and Hunger*. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2417\(2018\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2417(2018))
- Waal, Alex de. 1997. *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Indiana University Press.
- Waal, Alex de. 2015. *Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine*. Polity Press.
- Waal, Alex de. 2025. *Starvation in Gaza*. May 14. <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2025/may/starvation-in-gaza>
- Weizman, Eyal. 2017. *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*. Verso.
- White House. 2020. Peace to Prosperity (Trump Plan). <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/peacetoprospersity/>
- Wolfe, Patrick. 2006. Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native. *Journal of Genocide Research* 8(4): 387–409.
- World Bank, European Union, and United Nations. 2025. *Gaza and West Bank: Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment*. World Bank Group. <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/133c3304e29086819c1119fe8e85366b-0280012025/original/Gaza-RDNA-final-med.pdf>
- Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights. 2025. *Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the West Bank*. Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights. <https://www.yesh-din.org/en/data-sheet-law-enforcement-on-israeli-civilians-in-the-west-bank-settler-violence-2005-2024/>

DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies is a leading independent public research institute dedicated to the analysis of international affairs. DIIS conducts and disseminates multidisciplinary research on globalisation, security, development, and foreign policy. DIIS is committed to contributing to academic scholarship, shaping policy agendas, and informing public discourse. We put great effort into ensuring that research findings and their possible applications are accessible and relevant to policymakers, practitioners, and the wider public.

Defence and Security Studies at DIIS

This publication forms part of the Defence and Security Studies project at DIIS. The project aims to provide in-depth multidisciplinary knowledge on topics that are central to Danish defence and security policy, both at present and in the long term. The design and the conclusions of research conducted by the Defence and Security Studies project are fully independent. All reports undergo peer-review. The views expressed do not reflect those of the Danish ministries or any other government agencies involved, nor do they constitute an official position of DIIS. Further information about DIIS and its Defence and Security Studies project can be found at www.diis.dk.

Subscribe to
DIIS's newsletter



DIIS · DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Stockholmsgade 45 | DK-2100 Copenhagen | Denmark | www.diis.dk